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INTRODUCTION

Access to Justice: Who, How and When?
The phrase "access to justice" invokes a wide range of
questions. They include the following: What kind of access is
sought? For whom and on what terms? Does access provide
personal agency, or does it need to be mediated and secured by a
third party? And what is the "justice" to which one is entitled to
access, exactly? Does the justice to which someone is entitled, for
example, require only that he be heard, or does it imply the
assurance of some right or set of rights beyond that? Can access to
justice be provided when someone else speaks for one to secure a
right he enjoys but that is being denied to him?' Clearly, a single
article cannot address and disentangle these and many related
questions at once. Nonetheless, this Article undertakes to tackle
some of the complicated and challenging questions surrounding
access to justice at least as they relate to one set of questions,
namely collective and diffuse urban and environmental claims. In
doing so, the Article does not pretend to be exhaustive; it cannot
A.

I See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3-19 (2004) (observing
different conceptions of how best to provide justice access); James P. George,
Access to Justice, Costs, and Legal Aid, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 315 (2006)
(noting unresolved questions); see also, e.g., Diego Am6rico Robles, El
Concepto de Acceso a la Justicia, in EL ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA: CONTRIBUCIONES
TEbRICO-EMPiRICAS EN Y DESDE PAISES LATINOMERICANOS 29-32 (Sonia

Boueiri Bassil ed., 2010).
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be.2 However, I nonetheless hope that the Article can contribute
usefully to the debate about what we seek to achieve when we talk
about providing "access to justice" on an increasingly urban
planet-and, in the process, assist in the complicated task of
making "justice" more widely available.
The above questions are particularly pressing for the
estimated four billion people in the world who lack access to legal
means for the safe and efficient resolution of disputes and claims. 3

Moreover, to a considerable extent the disputes that affect a
significant portion of this population involve property and
environmental concerns. For billions of people, insecurity in longterm work opportunities and access to consistent housing promotes
precarious living conditions.' In addition, for many if not most of
2 Indeed, scholars devote their careers to the subject, resulting in an
outpouring of books and articles. Two of the most notable are Deborah Rhode
and Mauro Cappelletti. For a sampling of their productions on the topic, see
RHODE, supra note 1; Mauro Cappelletti, Acceso A La Justicia. ProgramaDe
Acci6n Reformadora Y Nuevo Mdtodo De Pensamiento, 16 BOLETiN MEXICANO

&

DE DERECHO COMPARADO 797-814 (1983) [hereinafter Cappelletti 1983]; Mauro
Cappelletti et al., Access to Justice-Variationsand Continuity of a Worldwide
Movement, 54 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 221 (1985) [hereinafter Cappelletti et al.];
Bryant G. Garth & Mauro Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the
Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFFALO L.R. 181 (1978)
[hereinafter Garth & Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave]; Deborah
L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1227 (2014) [hereinafter Rhode, A Roadmap for Reform]; Deborah L. Rhode,
Whatever Happened to Access to Justice? 42 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 869 (2009);
Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: A Comparative Perspective on
Access to Legal Services and Accountability of the Legal Profession, 56
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 93-121 (2003) [hereinafter Rhode, In the Interests
ofJustice].
3 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Commission
for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Making the Law Work for Everyone, v.
1 at 4-6 (2008) [hereinafter CLEP Report v. 1]; see also Maurits Barendrecht
Maaike de Langen, Legal Empowerment of the Poor: Innovating Access to
Justice, in THE STATE OF ACCESS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF DEMOCRACIES TO

CREATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 252 (Jorrit de Jong and Gowher Rizvi, eds.,
2008) [hereinafter Barendrecht & de Langen] ("The Commission on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor takes a somewhat different approach to legal
empowerment because the main problems that the commission focuses on are
poverty and exclusion, which, it argues, are intimately related. The rallying cry
of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor is that 4 billion people in
the world are excluded from the rule of law. This indicates that the agenda of the
commission is broader than access to justice alone, because it looks at exclusion
from the rule of law more broadly.. . .").
4 See UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, UNFPA STATE OF WORLD
POPULATION: UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF URBAN GROWTH 38 (2007); Franz

von Benda-Beckmann, Legal Pluralism and Social Justice in Economic and
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this population, the insecurity and fragility of their situations is
worsened by living in unhealthy and even dangerous physical and
built environments, suggesting that the possibility to change those
5
conditions would lead to more dignified, productive lives.
To examine this situation, this Article proceeds in five parts.
Part I considers four prominent theories on the meaning of "access
to justice." To be sure, the lines and divisions between these
positions are in practice less rigid than this text will at times
suggest. Nonetheless, the four approaches are sufficiently different
from one another to justify a critical evaluation. Part I therefore
undertakes to provide such an evaluation of these different
proposals. In this, Part I seeks to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the different proposals with respect to the search for
answers to some of the questions related to what "access to
justice" means, identified at the outset above.
Part II then focuses more narrowly on the question of urban
and environmental rights. It undertakes to briefly lay out what I
take to be the principal claims for urban and environmental rights
that have gained traction throughout the modem world, notably the
claims for the right to the city and for environmental justice. I
suggest that the reach of these claims is especially relevant to a
discussion of the meaning of the phrase "access to justice." The
claims directly invoke rights, yet the answer to what exactly it
means to enjoy one's right to the city or to assert a claim for
environmental justice often remains unclear.6
PoliticalDevelopment, 32 IDS BULLETIN 46, 46-47 (Jan. 1, 2001) (maintaining
that property rights and distribution remain a very unaddressed part of debate
about role of rule of law in achieving economic growth).
5 See generally, CITIES ALLIANCE & PREFEITURA DA CIDADE DE SAO
PAULO, SLUM UPGRADING UP CLOSE EXPERIENCES OF SIX CITIES (Cities Alliance
2008); see also, e.g., Lyla Mehta et al., Editorial: Environmental Governance in

an Uncertain World, 32 IDS BULLETIN 1, 1-8 (Oct. 2001).
6 In the environmental justice context, for instance, there has long been a
tension between more traditional, technical solutions and solutions that left
direction of strategy and demands to the affected communities. The pioneering
environmental justice attorney, Luke Cole, articulated the latter view with great
force a generation ago. See, e.g., Brent Newell, Remembering Luke Cole, 25 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 3 (2010); Luke W. Cole, The Theory and Reality of
Community-Based Environmental Decisionmaking: The Failure of California's
Tanner Act and Its Implicationsfor Environmental Justice, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.

733 (1999); Luke W. Cole, EnvironmentalJustice Litigation: Another Stone in
David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1994); Luke W. Cole, Remedies for
Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991 (1992);

Luke W. Cole, Empowerment

as the Key to Environmental Protection,
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The focus on urban and environmental rights is useful for at
least three reasons. First, the world is now a majority urban
planet.' This significant demographic shift has manifold
consequences for both the physical and built environments we
inhabit and effects our liberties and lives at every turn.' Second, by
virtue of the nature of the difficulties and possible harms created
by urban and environmental problems, urban and environmental
rights affect us both as individuals and as members of distinct
communities, thus putting to the test some of the different
approaches to securing access to justice described in Part I.1 Third,
by their nature, most urban and environmental rights claims affect
not scattered individuals, but large swaths of people located in
cities, towns and regions. In sum, then, the urban and
environmental rights focus arguably responds to areas of our
common experience that are creating new social and legal
challenges, in turn demanding new legal responses rather than
solutions honed over past decades. As a result, in Part II I will
argue that the way to think about access to justice in the urban and
environmental rights context tends to require arguments in favor of
collective and diffuse rights, which will be discussed more fully
below.
Part III then analyzes the challenges for securing access to
justice in the urban and environmental context in terms of leading
theories defining "access to justice" identified in that Part. Part III
also offers normative suggestions as to the best means to provide
access to justice for the vindication of urban and environmental
I

ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992). Some of the challenges in asserting individual claims
to aspects of the right to the city are discussed infra notes 136-138 and
accompanying text.
7 See U.N. HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, GLOBAL REPORT ON
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2009: PLANNING SUSTAINABLE CITIES xxii (Earthscan

2009).
8 1 am thus excluding rural settings in which land and environmental rights
are a matter of struggle. I do not mean to diminish their importance but have so
chosen to limit my area of attention. On such disputes in rural settings, see, for
example, Chao Zhou & Dan Banik, Access to Justice and Social Unrest in
China's Countryside: Disputes on Land Acquisition and Compensation, 6.2
HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 254 (2014).
9 In Rhode's work, for example, when she focuses on groups she almost
always refers to the individual needs of persons similarly situated (e.g. by
income status, disability, race or ethnicity), rather than of the need to provide
services that would assist the advance of claims those individuals suffer together,
as members of a collective. See, e.g., Rhode, In the Interests of Justice, supra
note 2, at 93-121.
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rights. The conclusion lays out next steps.
B.

Background

Before proceeding to identify the different theoretical
positions for what constitutes "access to justice," it is important to
provide a brief historical view of the modem development of the
term and debates surrounding it. Much of the current discussion
about the meaning of "access to justice" stems from the
eponymous movement, the origins of which date back to the mid1960s.10 The debates-and the movement associated with themintensified into the 1970s and 1980s.1 ' Concurrently, and
importantly for the latter part of this analysis, this period also saw
the rise in rule of law and development approaches that reflected
dissatisfaction with more conventional intemational institution-led
approaches (such as the United Nations and World Bank) to legal
12
reform in less-developed and undeveloped countries.
Implicitly, these parallel and sometimes overlapping
movements sought to combat the recognition that imbalanced
10 See Garth & Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave, supra note
2, at 196.
11 Even in the mid-1970s Cappelletti recognized the growing importance of
what we now call collective and diffuse rights claims. See, e.g., Mauro
Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil
Litigation:A Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REV. 793, 880 (1975) [hereinafter
Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates] ("A premise of the preceding
discussion is that in modem societies new general, collective, 'public' needs and
interests have been forcefully emerging. Such needs and interests are an
outgrowth of the most basic characteristics of our twentieth century
'civilization.' Whether we like it or not, modem societies are characterized by
mass production, mass commerce and consumption, mass urbanization, and mass
labor conflicts, all of which require regulation. These new, pressing needs and
interests must find access to the courts.").
12 See Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 262 (surveying criticisms
of law and development approaches for the last four decades); see also Jorge L.
Esquirol, The Geopolitics of Constitutionalism in Latin America, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS: STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE LAW AND
LEGAL CULTURE 79, 90-91 (Colin Crawford & Daniel Bonilla Madonado eds.,

2018) (criticizing consequences of law and development approaches for
perceptions of Latin America). Compare LINN HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING
REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 10-14 (2007)
[hereinafter HAMMERGREN, EnvisioningReform] (surveying some of the external
support for judicial reform efforts in Latin America and questioning its
premises). See generally LINN HAMMERGREN, JUSTICE REFORM AND
DEVELOPMENT: RETHINKING DONOR ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING AND
TRANSITION COUNTRIES (2014) (examining failures of foreign aid donors to

promote judicial access efforts).
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power relations led to inequitable justice provision across the
globe.13 As a result, the now-dominant theories for what "access to
justice" should mean seek, in different ways and with varying
intensity, to redress legal and other related service and fairness
imbalances to create more opportunities for those with less to
secure rights. 1 4
I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THEORETICAL POSITIONS

Theoretical positions on what constitutes "access to justice"
differ greatly-unsurprising, given the imprecision of the words
"access" and "justice." But the positions share several features in
common. First, they share a concern that in most places and at
most times, the less privileged members of a society are those who
are not able to access justice"-no matter what "justice" is
understood to mean.16 Second, all positions agree that access to
justice, no matter how small or large involves expenditures of time
and money that most people would prefer to avoid." Third, and
equally as important, the act of securing justice typically incurs
costs such as emotional stress whose effects on individuals, and
13 See, e.g. Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 258-59 (noting the global
recognition of enforcement failures).
14 Cappelletti 1983, supra note 2, at 799, 804.
15 See, e.g., CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3, at 15 ("In too many countries,
the laws, institutions, and policies governing economic, social, and political
affairs deny a large part of society the chance to participate on equal terms. The
rules of the game are unfair. This is not only morally unacceptable; it stunts
economic [development] and can readily undermine stability and security. The
outcomes of governance-that is, the cumulative effect of policies and
institutions on peoples' lives-will only change if the processes of governance
are fundamentally changed."); see also, Frank S. Bloch, Access to Justice and the
Global Clinical Movement, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 111, 117-121 (2008)
(describing role of university-based legal clinics in expanding access to justice as
a means to promote social reform across the world).
16 See Jorrit de Jong & Gowher Rizvi, The Caste and the Village: The Many
&

Faces of Limited Access, in THE STATE OF ACCESS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF
DEMOCRACIES TO CREATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 8-11 (Jorrit de Jong

Gowher Rizvi eds., 2008). Alfred Aman, in a similar vein, pushes us to ask what
the consequences are for access to governmental services generally in a world
where such services are increasingly privatized, leading to what he labels a
"democracy deficit." Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the
Needfor a New AdministrativeLaw, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1687, 1708-09 (2002).
17 See, e.g., Maurits Barendrecht et al., How to Measure the Price and
Quality of Access to Justice? 4 (2006) [hereinafter Access to Justice Study
Group], http://www.hiil.org/publication/how-to-measure-the-price-and-qualityof-access-to-justice.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

2018]

347

reverberations felt by the larger society, cannot easily be
measured." Fourth, accessing justice, again often irrespective of
the nature or size of the issue that leads to the desire for access,
can be complicated, involving many social actors with effects on a
wide array of individuals. 19 These shared aspects of the theoretical
positions seeking to defend access to justice must be remembered
in the discussion that follows, because they inform the nature of
each theoretical response.
In the debate about the phrase's meaning, at least four
prominent positions can be identified. Two of the positions come
from commentators who believe that, on balance, in a well-run
society, law is an end in itself Those associated with this
theoretical position can therefore be labeled the "law-focused"
access to justice theorists. For this camp, access to justice requires
promoting the rule of law for its own sake in the first instance,
with a resulting focus on the construction and refinement of legal
institutions.
Within the "law-focused" camp, one can identify two
different positions. The first of these is the more paternalistic one,
consisting of those who argue that the priority must be to focus on
what might be called the "mega-structure" of legal institutions.
This group works from the top-down to transmit the values and
build the structures necessary to provide justice. The second lawfocused sub-group, by contrast, argues that this work must be done
from the bottom up, building upon an articulation of individual
values.
Distinct from the "law-focused" camp, a third group of
commentators argues that law and its institutions are not ends in
themselves, but rather that they are a means to an end. This group
is focused on societal justice in the largest sense, valuing an
accessible legal system as one tool among many to improve
justice. For this camp, therefore, legal institutions and the rule of
law matter principally to the extent that they fulfill other, defined
goals, such as guaranteeing freedoms that allow people to live their
lives unfettered by the controls of others or that allow resource
distributions that improve the quality of lives. I call this the
"integrated with law" position.
Finally, I call the fourth theoretical position the "integrated
18
19

See, e.g., id. at 7-8.
See, e.g., id. at 5-6, 12.
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without law" theorists, or, more precisely, the "integrated without
necessarily focusing on law" theorists. This group does not believe
that law is always essential to assure justice or provide access to it.
In other words, this fourth group believes that justice may be
accessed, depending on context and circumstance, outside of the
rule of law itself.
This Article will now consider each of these four camps. For
the purposes of comparing these different theoretical positions, the
analysis will identify the principle that apparently justifies the
position, then articulate the goal that it seeks to achieve (that is, the
answer to the question, "What constitutes access to justice?") and,
finally, identify the method that the position advocates to achieve
that goal.
A.

Law-Focusedand Top-Down
These theorists, led in the United States by Deborah Rhode
and perhaps most closely identified outside the United States with
the Italian scholar Mauro Cappelletti (albeit a generation ago),
adhere to the principle that access to justice means the provision of
comprehensive legal services available to all members of a society.
This position, which has been widely influential and much
discussed in the legal literature, not only in the United States but
elsewhere,2 0 holds that the provision of such comprehensive
services is essential for a healthy, functioning society. 2 1 The goal,
therefore, is to correct for inequities by providing a wide range of
equivalent legal services for all people, irrespective of their
resources. The underlying assumption here is that solid legal
service provision will redress imbalances of social and economic
power and lead to a fairer society. Clearly, this is an ambitious
goal, one that both requires a high degree of consensus about the
values that matter most and a good deal of social engineering to
build the requisite institutional architecture. For this reason, I
classify its approach as top down.
The theory has traction at both national and international
levels. In the United States, for example, the State of
Massachusetts has formalized this approach with the creation of an
20

See generally Marta Infantino, Integration Through Comparative Private

Law: FourLessons from Cappelletti, 14 INT. J. CONST. L. 492 (2016) (evaluating
Cappelletti's influence).
21 See generallyRhode, supra note 2.
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Access to Justice Commission, the aim of which is to ensure
widespread legal services. 22 Writing in the mid-1980s, one
celebrated group of scholars who supported this view observed as
follows about the appeal of such ideas internationally:
The substantive law has increasingly been manipulated in
recent decades to enforce governmental policies; and now there
has been a strong tendency to manipulate procedural law and
institutions with those same policies in mind. One of those
policies, quite clearly, consists simply in favoring access to
lawyers and the institutions necessary to resolve disputes and
enforce legal rights.23
By 2010, even an institution like the World Bank, one whose
original mandate had nothing to do with legal service provision,
could be found advocating the importance of access to legal
services in rule of law projects aimed to help lift people from
poverty.2 4
If the principle underlying this position is that strong, fair,
orderly societies are undergirded by well-functioning legal
systems, the goal is to realize this theoretical ambition by
providing legal services of equal quality to all. This raises the
question of what, exactly, constitutes legal services. As the
language cited from Cappelletti above suggests, for many years the
focus was on widening access to lawyers in traditional advocacy
roles. Subsequently, however, there have been arguments to
expand this definition to focus on other efforts, including
conciliation activities (alternate dispute resolution, for example)
and reforms of the legal profession, requiring, for one, expanded
25
pro bono service for those without means to hire a lawyer.
Importantly, this is a position that tends to focus on
individuals and not groups, stressing the need to concentrate on the

22 See
MASSACHUSETTS
ACCESS
TO
JUSTICE
COMMISSION,
http://www.massa2j.org/a2j/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
23 Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 222.
24 See Vivek Maru, Access to Justice andLegal Empowerment: A Review of
World Bank Practice, 2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 259, 260-61 (2010) (reviewing
World Bank justice access reform efforts). But see Carlos A. Lista, Prologo, in
EL ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA, supra note 1, at 13 (criticizing view of justice reform
tied to economic goals like efficiency).
25 See Cappeletti, Garth & Trocker, supra note 2, at 222. Such proposals are
a constant refrain of Rhode's. See Rhode, A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 2,
at 1228.
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defense of individual liberties and rights.2 6 This is not, however,
uniformly true. Cappelletti himself noted the different proposals
from those in this camp (in which he could be included) that
focused on group needs, including those who advocated for free
legal services (or "judicare") and those who focused on more
broad-based interventions in favor of group claims--class actions
in the United States, for example. 27
Indeed, even in the mid-1980s, Cappelletti noted the growing
importance of non-individual claims for what we now know as
"collective and diffuse interests"-that is, claims like clean air, for
example, that affect a group or groups (identifiable collective
interests) or a wide variety of unconnected persons or interests (a
diffuse and not concentrated interest). 28 These types of claims, of
course, have only grown in importance since then, given
exponential rates of urbanization and associated environmental
harm to groups within urban areas. 29 In theoretical terms, however,
what links the efforts of legal theorists like Rhode and Cappelletti
is that they share a commitment to strengthening legal institutions
and structures to provide a range of traditional legal services,
primarily from trained legal professionals.
Accordingly, the method that is ch6sen to realize the theory
and achieve the goal varies but tends to concentrate on three
measures: increasing state financial support for no-cost legal
26 As I have indicated, this is a principal criticism I have of Rhode's work.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also supra note 14; Daniel Bonilla
Maldonado, Extralegal Property, Legal Monism, and Pluralism, 40 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 213 (2009) (arguing against excessive dependence on legal
monism in property rights situations); Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick & Rajendra Pradha,
Implications of Legal Pluralism for Natural Resource Management, 32 IDS
BULLETIN 10 (2001) (arguing for the importance of pluralist and other nonindividualist property regimes in natural resource management).
27 Cappeletti, Garth & Trocker, supra note 2, at 230.
28 See generally Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates, supra
note 11; see also Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 236-41 (on importance of
attending to diffuse interest claims); Garth & Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The
Newest Wave, supra note 2, at 195 (citing that research showing that diffuse
interests are not always best supported by government-and urban and
environmental are most often of this type). See also id. at 209-22 for a
discussion of the development of the defense of these interests.
29 See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, SUSTAINABLE URBANIZATION
STRATEGY 4-8 (2016) [hereinafter UNDP STRATEGY] (on environmental and
related harms associated with unplanned urbanization); UNITED NATIONS DEP'T
OF Soc. & ECON. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 2014
REVISION 21-31 (2014).
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services, requiring that lawyers fulfill expanded pro bono legal
service requirements, and expanding legal services through
institutions like law schools.30 Some proponents of this theory seek
to achieve other, more novel measures. Rhode herself, although
long focused primarily on enhancing and expanding formal legal
31
services for those with fewer financial and social resources, has
more recently supported models that would improve the quality of
non-lawyer delivered services, such as pro se representation
training. 32 Others go much further, finding that access to justice
requires delivering a full range of legal services to enable people to
conduct their daily activities, from basic counseling and
33
commercial advice to transactional planning and advice.
Putting this top-down, law-centered theory of access to justice
to work is not, however, without its complications. Rhode herself,
in some of her more recent work, acknowledges challenges in
several areas, including financial, structural, and doctrinal
concerns.3 4 The financial challenges are perhaps the most obvious.
Legal education is expensive, in time and resources needed to train
legal professionals. Those who advocate this model for improving
access to justice insist on the importance of formal training to
provide high-quality legal services. 35 In this, the model can be
criticized for being available only in the context of more
economically developed societies like the United States or some
countries in the European Union. 36
30 See, e.g., Rhode, In the Interests ofJustice, supra note 2, at 96-102.
31 See id. at 103-04.
32 See Rhode, A Roadmapfor Reform, supra note 2, at 1242; see generally
Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed Counsel, Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (2012).
33 See, e.g. George, supra note 1, at 303-05 (reviewing some alternative
dispute resolution options); Steven H. Hobbs, Shout from Taller Rooftops: A
Response to DeborahRhode's Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 93841 (2005) (detailing forms an expanded notion ofjustice access could take).
34 Rhode, A Roadmapfor Reform, supra note 2, at 1228-1240. Rhode also
includes a fourth area of concern, namely what she calls "political" concerns. I
omit discussion of them here because they are limited to the U.S. political
context. See id. at 1238-40.
35 See generally, Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice Requires Access to
Attorneys: Restrictions on the Practice of Law Serve a Societal Purpose, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2761 (2014).

36 In fact, Rhode herself implicitly recognizes this in some of her work,
indicating that her proposals aim to present a prescription for the U.S. only. See,
e.g., RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 285 ("The ideal of equal justice
is deeply embedded in American legal traditions. . . . Our nation prides itself on
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For Rhode and other like theorists, structural problems are
also serious, given "the absence of any coherent system for
allocating assistance and matching clients with the most costeffective service provider" and "the mismatch between supply and
demand that often underlies the inequality." 37 Overcoming these
structural problems would also require much time and many
resources, as well as political cooperation.
Doctrinal concerns include the resistance of courts-again,
largely in economically developed countries with relatively wellfunctioning, complex legal systems-to allow representation by
non-lawyers and expanding standards for when a court-appointed
legal counsel can be made available.3 1 In sum, the top-down, lawcentric access to justice theory suffers from being resourceintensive due to the existence of an elaborate system that requires a
high degree of technical expertise to function well. 39 As a result,
despite the best intentions of its advocates, an almost certain
consequence of the model is that, in practice, it is economically
and socially regressive: those with the fewest social and economic
resources have the least access to some kind of justice.
This is not to say that the theory lacks appeal. At least four
advantages to it can be identified. First, one can defend it on the
grounds that any theory seeking to widen access to justice must, at
its core, insist on the creation, defense, and elaboration of a legal
system based upon the rule of law. This view is consistent with
classic theories of democratic governance that stress the need for
the rule of law to be maintained by its gatekeeper institutions
(especially courts) to protect civil and political rights above all.40
its commitment to the rule of law.").
37 Rhode, A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 2, at 1230. Garth and
Cappelletti long ago therefore argued for creative responses to this problem, such
as funding more or different services, or making them accessible in different
ways. Garth & Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave, supra note 2, at
228.
38 Rhode, A Roadmapfor Reform, supra note 2, at 1233.
39 Rhode herself is aware of these challenges and offers potential solutions.
See id. at 1242 and accompanying footnotes. In my view, however, even the
solutions work only in the context of a sophisticated, elaborate legal system like
that existing in the United States. One set of responses would include increased
dependence on other, less traditional means of dispute resolution. Again, such
proposals have been on the table for a long time. See Garth & Cappelletti, Access
to Justice: The Newest Wave, supra note 2, at 223.
40 See, e.g., Roberto Gargarella, Theories of Democracy, the Judiciary and
Social Rights, in COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
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Second, this theory can also be understood to emerge from a
commitment to equality, in the sense that it insists upon the ability
of all persons, irrespective of resources, to obtain competent
counsel as they seek justice.4 1 Third, because the theory sets a high
bar as to what constitutes legal representation and also what it
means to obtain justice, the theory advances a position that can
yield measurable results.4 2 In principle, measurability would
promote efficiency, since flaws are more evident. Fourth and
finally, advocates of this theory argue that putting into place a
system that contains a version of the rule of law that insists upon
access to justice as a key feature establishes the necessary
circumstances for securing other rights, such as social and
economic rights. 43

Conversely, at least five principal criticisms of the law-centric
top-down access to justice theory can be identified. First, the
resource-intensive requirements of the theory make it impractical
for large-scale application. In many parts of the world, well over
half of the population lives in poverty.44 In such circumstances, the
first national priority is unlikely to be expanded legal
representation. Moreover, even where available, vindication of
legal claims may not be a popular priority. In some poorer
countries, evidence suggests that courts are not overburdened even
when most litigation involves small matters that are not especially
costly to resolve.4 5 This suggests that, when resources are scarce,
AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? 13 (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo

& Theunis Roux eds., 2006). But see Garth and Cappelletti, who, writing in
1978, offered a spirited defense of the need to serve the individual needs of all
systems through robust, traditional legal institutions, but in flexible, efficient,
low-cost ways. Garth & Cappelletti, supra note 2, at 240-41.
41 See Nicholson, supra note 35, at 2777 ("Access to justice, if it is to have
any true meaning, must mean access to equal legal services.") But see Garth and
Cappelletti, who argued for changing the normative expectation of what
constitutes acceptable lawyer practice-not of course, to promote malpractice,
but to change the nature of the obligation, accounting for different kinds of cases
and circumstances. Garth & Cappelletti, supra note 2 at 238-77.
42 However, measuring success can be challenging depending on what
criteria are used. See Access to Justice Study Group, supra note 17, at 13-19.
43 See Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 225 (citing Austin Sarat's criticisms
of legal representation theories that do not undertake to effect wide and deep
social transformation).
44 See UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, UNFPA STATE OF WORLD
POPULATION: UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF URBAN GROWTH 15-16 (2007).
45 See, e.g., Linn Hammergren, Expanding the Rule ofLaw: JudicialReform
in Latin America, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 601, 606 (2005) ("Let me
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accessing and achieving justice may not be a top priority. Second,
and a related point, is that the expense of this theory is limited in
application to societies that have the benefit of operating some sort
of "welfare state economics" inasmuch as without state support,
some portion of the population will never be able to afford the
expense, both financial and in time and effort, required to seek
judicial resolution of a dispute.4 6
Third, and a response to the arguable benefit of producing
measurable results, the theory operates on the assumption that
results equal fairness. But that assumption remains to be proven;47
results. instead may speak primarily to efficiency. Fourth, and
consistent with the prior concern, some critics of this theory
express concern that the focus on laws and legal institutions risks
favoring those who already have power.4 8 This worry centers
around what Marc Galanter has called "relative party capability,"
meaning the relative ability of some to access social and economic
resources which are unavailable to others.4 9 And. while, as noted
above, Rhode and other defenders of this theoretical position try to
grapple with these concerns by stressing need for "structural"
reforms, that may be easier said than done.5 o
Fifth, what has been described by critics as the "excessive
legalism" of this theoretical position may not be either the most
efficient or most effective way to secure rights.5 1 In sum, the lawjust talk about a couple of original and revised assumptions based on what we
have learned over the past twenty years about judicial performance. First, there is
the assumption that Latin American courts are overloaded with work. You will
find no end of proposals for reform, but when we actually look at caseloads, we
find out that most trial courts do not receive unmanageable numbers of filings.
Some of the case loads are surprisingly low; in some countries at least half the
judges get only two or three hundred filings a year, and these are not complex
cases. Because the average case in Latin America, as it is elsewhere, is usually
debt collection or some fairly simple family dispute, not extensive litigation.").
46 This weakness of the model was recognized as far back as the 1970s.
See,
e.g., Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 226-27; Garth & Cappelletti, Access to
Justice: The Newest Wave, supra note 2, at 188-89.
47 See Access to Justice Study Group, supra note 17, at 8-9.
48 See, e.g., Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 223. As they note, this was a
concern Max Weber had in the early 20th century. See id. at 258.
49 Marc Galanter, Afterward: Explaining Litigation, 9 L. & Soc. REV. 347,
360 (1975) (discussed by Garth & Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest
Wave, supra note 2, at 190-93).
50 Garth & Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave, supra note 2, at
190-92.
51 Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 226. A powerful and more general
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focused, top-down approach may simply be unrealistic for many
realities. As Golub has observed:
Today's heavy emphasis on judges, lawyers and courts is
analogous to what the public health field would look like if it
mainly focused on urban hospitals and the doctors staffing
them, and largely ignored nurses, other health workers,
maternal and public education, other preventive approaches,
rural and community health issues, building community
capacities, and nonmedical strategies (such as improving
sanitation and water supply). 52

B.

Law-Focusedand Bottom- Up
The "bottom-up" version of a law-focused theory of access to
justice adheres to the same principles and goals as described in the
"top-down" theory. It differs, however, in its method. In order to
assure a well-functioning legal system, and thus guarantee that all
members of a society have access to justice, this version of a lawfocused theory of access to justice recommends an effort to build
the system from the roots up in order to fashion a consensus on
how best to construct the legal institutions that will assure access
to justice for all. Thus, the bottom-up version of a law-focused
theory shares with the top-down theory a belief that getting good
legal service is a key to a healthy, functioning society and that
providing such services will help ease social inequities, if not
entirely abolish them.
This is then a view that aims to avoid some of the elitist
concerns about the operation of the top-down theory examined in
the previous section. 53 This is accomplished, in large part, because
critique of what I have called the "excessive legalism" of this approacharguably a very uncritical legalism-may be found in FRANK UPHAM,
MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY 75-104 (Thomas Carothers ed.,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006).
52 Stephen Golub, A House Without a Foundation,in PROMOTING THE RULE
OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 106 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
53 To be sure, the law-focused, top-down justice access thinkers discussed
above do not perceive themselves as promoting an elitist vision. Indeed, the
access to justice theorists focus on changing the circumstances of the poor. See,
e.g., Rhode, A Roadmap for Reform, supra note 2. The key distinction here is
that for what I have labelled the law-focused, top-down justice access theorists,
the poor and socially excluded are not central actors in the design of the services
they are to receive. Thus, the "bottom-up" reformers conceive of themselves as
being engaged in a quite different project, both ideologically and
methodologically. See Maurits Barendrecht, Rule of Law, Measuring and
Accountability: Problems to Be Solved Bottom Up, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 281
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the law-focused, bottom-up theorists focus not only on questions
regarding the supply-side of access to justice (such as qualitative
questions of whether there are enough judges and lawyers and
whether they are sufficiently well-trained, for example) but also on
the demand-side, by measuring with precision the needs of those
who believe their rights have been violated.54 Thus,
methodologically, at their best, the law-focused, bottom-up
theorists seek to use a mixed-methods approach, one that is both
qualitative and quantitative.
Given this commitment to understanding both sides of the
supply and demand relationship, some bottom-up, law-focused
theorists have argued for an expanded definition of what
constitutes "legal services" by including the work of paralegals,
who have less formal training and who provide services at lower
rates.5 5 Other reforms from this camp include proposals for the use
of pre-paid legal service plans that function much like insurance,
able to offer lower cost services by spreading the costs across a
subscriber pool whose members do not uniformly require legal
representation to vindicate rights.5 6
In addition to the advantages of the top-down theory noted
above, this version of a law-focused access to justice theory has
(2011); Benjamin van Rooij, Bringing Justice to the Poor, Bottom-up Legal
Development Cooperation, 4 HAGUE J. ON R. LAW 286-318 (2012). In fact,
neither Barendrecht nor van Rooij tend to give much attention to the very U.S.focused theorists like Rhode. Indeed, the only reference I have seen in their work
is negative. See Barendrecht, supra, at 300 n.35 ("The most cited book on access
to justice does not contain a clear definition of the concept.") (internal citation
omitted).
54 See Access to Justice Study Group, supra note 17, at 19-20; see also van
Rooij, supra note 53.
55 See, e.g., Lars Waldorf, Introduction:Legal Empowerment in Transitions,
19 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 229, 231 (2015) (describing international examples of
community-based paralegals and the reasons some defend the practice). But see
Colleen F. Shanahan et al., Can a Little RepresentationBe a Dangerous Thing?
67 HASTINGs L.J. 1367 (2016) (arguing that a move towards greater dependence
on paralegal professionals will result in reduced law reform efforts by those
capable of asserting the rights of low- and middle-income persons).
56 Cappelletti and Garth, to cite one example, discussed both the possible
increased use of paralegals and pre-paid legal services a generation ago, and even
noted some concerns. Alternatives that looked promising may be less than hoped.
See Garth & Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave, supra note 2, at
277-86. See e.g., Jeremy Bryant Tomes, Note, The Emergence of Group
and PrepaidLegal Services: Embracing a New Reality, 16 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. Bus. L. 25 (2014) (documenting the growth of these services in the
U.S.).
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the advantage of allowing involvement of those most traditionally
excluded from such decisions.5 7 In the process, such an approach
could also further the integration of other social and economic
8
rights- what used to be called "third generation" rights.
Importantly, some proponents of this position have taken a
grounded approach that seeks to identify empirical metrics that
59
would help shape this position, rendering it more than a platitude.
The task for these theorists is straightforward. In their own words,
"[o]ur approach is simple. Access to justice implies a (natural)
person who accesses some sort of procedure in order to solve a
conflict. This procedure is costly. What do these costs add up to?
And does the procedure ultimately lead to justice?" 6 0 Importantly,
for this group of theorists, the measurement needs to be more than
economic. Their aim is to develop "the possibilities of a
framework in which the costs and quality of access to justice can
be determined and where costs are not merely measured in terms
of money, but also in terms of time and emotional costs (e.g.
stress)." 6 1

This is not a trivial move. First, it reflects the theorists'
57

See, e.g., Carlos A. Lista, Pr6logo, in EL ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA, supra

note 1, at 15.
58

See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: The Protection of

the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (1982).
And at about the same time, Cappelletti and Garth identified what they called the
"third wave" of legal reform for justice access- ideas that, they maintained, in
part served to permit defense of these "newer" rights. See Garth & Cappelletti,
Access to Justice: The Newest Wave, supra note 2, at 222-27.
59 See Martin Gramatikov et al., Measuringthe Costs and Quality of Paths to

Justice: Contours of a Methodology, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L., 349, 350 (2011)
(asking how we can "make access to justice a quantifiable concept instead of a
broad aspiration?").
60 Access to Justice Study Group, supra note 17, at 3; See e.g., Maggi
Carfield, Note, Enhancing Poor People's CapabilitiesThrough the Rule ofLaw:
Creating an Access to Justice Index, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 339 (2005) (advocating a
justice access metric based on Amartya Sen's capabilities approach, but not
specifying criteria for such a metric). Other metrics embrace access to justice as
part of a rule of law focus, as for example the efforts of the World Justice
Project, a U.S.-based non-profit that began as an initiative of the American Bar
Association but is now independent of it. See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF
LAW INDEX 2016 12 (2016) (defining three different justice factors as

components of nine factors for rule of law), https://worldjusticeproject.org
/sites/default/files/documents/RoLlFinal-Digital_0.pdf. Van Rooij usefully
provides a comprehensive survey of both different rule of law and different
justice access initiatives. See van Rooij, supra note 53, at 288-99; see also
Gramatikov, supra note 59, at 350.
61

Access to Justice Study Group, supra note 17, at 5.
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integration of social scientific work from different disciplines
(economics, sociology, and psychology, among others) done in
recent decades aiming to measure access to justice from different
disciplinary perspectives.6 2 Second, the search for a nuanced set of
access to justice measures also represents an explicit rejection of
purely economic metrics, which aim, for example, to measure how
much money is spent to resolve a claim (on the part of all of the
actors involved, both individually and institutionally) and how
much is recovered in the process. 63 These theorists seek to apply a
"demand-oriented" or "user-based" perspective instead.' A
consequence of this user-based emphasis of the law-focused,
bottom-up theorists is to acknowledge the economic and social
imbalances that may prevent lower- and middle-income people
from receiving access to justice equivalent to that available to
those with more resources. If someone is not entitled to time off
from work to attend a court hearing, for example, she is in a very
different place than a corporate executive with greater flexibility
and less accountability for her time. This is not to suggest that
these theorists have an ideological agenda, or at least not
explicitly. On the contrary, their work does not advocate openly
for a distributive justice goal. 65 However, since as noted above,
most justice is inequitably resourced,6 6 a focus on users and their
needs almost certainly will demand a review of inequities and
solutions to address them.
To be sure, the choice of an appropriate metric, as these
theorists recognize, is much more complicated than might seem to
be the case at first glance. For example, they ask, should one
measure the "psychological costs" of deciding to bring an action?67
Answering that question in turn requires determining how to
62

See id. at 3-5.

63 See, e.g., id. at 15 ("Or, the lack of quality of the outcome can be seen as a
cost. In law and economics literature, paths are sometimes evaluated in a
framework that aims at minimizing the sum of decision and error costs.") (citing
C.R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of ProceduralFairness, 73 SOCIAL FAIRNESS
619 (2006)).
64 See, e.g., Gramatikov, supra note 59, at 351-52.
65 However, it bears noting that in a more recent work associated with this
position, the areas of focus for measurement on justice access as the "most
frequent and pressing legal needs" are those that characterize the lives of the
world's poor majority, from subsistence and lack of basic necessities to property
and personal insecurity. See id. at 356-57.
66 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
67 Access to Justice Study Group, supra note 17, at 8.
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measure those costs and then evaluating what type of action to
bring. As these theorists further recognize, it may also be essential
to consider not just the costs-financial, temporal, and
psychological-of an effort to access justice, but also to measure
the "quality" of the outcome. 68
The following example demonstrates how cost consideration
does not adequately consider individual justice desires. Suppose I
am robbed and my robber is identified, but has no resources with
which to compensate me for the robbed goods. If bringing an
action can nonetheless result in a criminal conviction, I might be
satisfied with the result. "Justice" has been done. But I might not
be: I might yearn to be made whole and for my goods to be
returned. 69 By emphasizing quality consideration in their metric,
the law-focused, bottom-up theorists aim to address such
considerations. In this and other ways, 0 these theorists aim to
produce a metric that is three-dimensional in the sense that it seeks
to measure the complications and multiple variables that constitute
what we mean by the phrase "access to justice."
For many of the law-focused, bottom-up theorists, the aim is
comparative. This approach seeks to provide a means to identify
best practices across countries, so as to be useful to the widest
possible range of people, while at the same time recognizing the
68

See, e.g., id. at 9.

69 As the Access to Justice Study Group notes: "[t]hree decades of sociolegal research have demonstrated that citizens also care deeply about the process
by which conflicts are resolved and decisions are made, even when outcomes are
unfavorable or the process they desire is slow or costly. So not only time and
money are important, things like lack of bias, thoroughness, clarity, voice (the
ability to tell one's story) and a dignified, respectful treatment are at least as
important." Access to JusticeStudy Group, supra note 17, at 16.
70 See generally id. For example, they explore the challenges of measuring
the implication of different kinds of error, ranging from errors because of
corruption to more mundane, less deliberate errors. See id. at 15 ("However,
measuring an error assumes that we can objectively distinguish a 'right' outcome
from an 'erroneous' outcome and that we also have an objective idea of the
magnitude of that error. A way to approach this is to consider 'the legally sound
decision a fully informed and objective court would reach' as the point of
reference. In theory, this works for errors arising from corruption, or for
settlements that are biased. It does not work, however, for 'regular' day-to-day
errors that occur in deciding cases. Neither does it work for informal paths such
as mediation, where different needs or concerns can be met, which may be
neglected in court proceedings. A more qualitative criterion, like some reference
to the manner in which the expected outcome will reflect the legitimate needs
and concerns of the complainant, might be preferable. But how can this be
established objectively?").
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need to be sensitive to local and cultural differences. 7 1 Since the
first articulation of these ideas in the early 2000s, these lawfocused, bottom-up theorists have worked to refine and explain
their methodology. 72 In addition, they have engaged in empirical
projects to test their methodology, in both more and less
economically developed countries.73 While the theorists continue
to seek more empirical support to improve the approach, this
methodical articulation and testing of theory presents a promise for
wide-scale application.
As the law-focused, bottom-up theorists recognize, their
proposals will be most effective going forward if proponents work
to prioritize the type of justice provided. For instance, an advocate
may ask whether more attention should be given to property
offenses or family disputes. This is, however, challenging to
determine, and a cause of concern for the intellectual leaders of
this position. 74 A continuing challenge, moreover, will be to
expand the metric to evaluate the utility and effectiveness of
different methods of dispute resolution, including informal
techniques, for all stakeholders.75
There are other challenges as well. One might ask, for
example, why this theory focuses on building solid court systems
when there are more urgent needs for, say, health care, education,
or employment. The bottom-up version of the law-focused theory
of access to justice opens itself to the criticism that it distracts from
71 See id. at 20 ("In order to be used for comparative purposes, however, the
measurement tools will have to be sufficiently independent in relation to legal
culture, local preferences, and local resources. This may be hard to achieve. The
value of money, of time, and of 'a day in court' may vary across countries.").
72 See generally, Gramatikov, supra note 59; Maurits Barendrecht, Rule of
Law, Measuring and Accountability: Problems to be Solved Bottom Up, 3
HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 281 (2011); MARTIN GRAMATIKOV ET AL., A HANDBOOK
FOR MEASURING THE COSTS AND QUALITY OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Tilburg
Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Sys.
ed., 2009).
73 See Gramatikov, supra note 59, at 351 n.8 ("Pilot studies have been
conducted in the Netherlands, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Thailand, Poland, Australia,
Cameroon, Senegal, Afghanistan, Canada and other countries.").
74 See generally Maurits Barendrecht et al., Prioritiesfor the Justice System:
Responding to the Most Urgent Legal Problems of Individuals (TISCO Working
Paper No. 001/2008,2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1090885 (last visited June
13, 2017).
75 See, e.g., Garth & Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave, supra
note 2, at 232-38 (exploring the utility of emerging methods to resolve disputes
to the satisfaction of those involved).
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the real problems for populations most in need. In addition, the
theory's version of "excessive legalism" does not protect those
who are traditionally excluded from the legal system from others
with greater experience and more resources using these strong
76
institutions to delay and to harm the interests of those excluded.
This is a problem, however, that no theory may be able fully to
control. What is promising about the law-focused, bottom-up
theory-and in particular, with those theorists committed to
articulating and testing a reliable, comprehensive metric focused
on determining quality-is that it could be transformational for
many because of its ability to take individualized, grassroot needs
into account.
Integratedand Requiring Law
A more recent addition to the theoretical literature on access
to justice advances the third position considered here, labelled here
as "integrated and requiring law." This theoretical position, like
the two described above, is also centered around a commitment to
the rule of law as an essential-and sometimes the essential77
requirement for achieving a more just and equal society.
However, it departs from the aforementioned theories in two
important respects. First, the position articulates a robust definition
of the elements that constitute the rule of law, which, unlike the
approaches outlined above, is not limited to traditional legal
institutions and actors only. Second, and relatedly, this theoretical
position offers a much wider, more practical reach than the
previous two, allowing other aspects of human experience outside
of legal institutions and actors to serve the goal of access to justice.
As such, the position does not maintain that legal reform for access
to justice is an end in itself. Rather, this position views legal
reform, including access to justice, as a means to the end of
providing a better life for all.
The principle that undergirds this position differs from the
previous two in another key respect: it is explicitly multidisciplinary. For this reason, I have labelled it an "integrated"
theoretical position. Thus, law is but one element in the spectrum
C.

76

Such as, for example, the recognized benefits of "repeat players" over

"one-shotters." See Access to Justice Study Group, supra note 17, at 4 (citing

work by Marc Galanter).
77 See e.g., CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3, at 15, 27.
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of tools that may be used to make justice available, and this
element's importance and value will change depending on the
situation. Under this position, law is a mechanism used to provide
a wide variety of services and to satisfy many needs; its effective
use for the poor and those most in need of legal services must be
informed by the social sciences. In this, of course, the legal
empowerment approach shares much with the law-focused,
bottom-up theorists who, as they note, drew upon decades of social
science research.7 8 And indeed, in broad terms, legal
empowerment shares many of the grassroots goals of the lawfocused, bottom-up theorists. The difference between the two is
definitional, defining "justice" that is being accessed differently, as

well as strategic. 79

This position closely identifies with the legal empowerment
movement and with the deliberations of the Commission for the
Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP), an independent global
commission consisting of representatives from diverse nations
which was established in 2005. While CLEP will be discussed at
length in what follows as an illustration of the theory, it is
important to remember that this position embraces more than just
CLEP's efforts and deliberations.8 0
The goal of the legal empowerment position, in contrast to
that of the two theoretical positions already discussed, is not
merely to provide the architecture necessary to deliver formal legal
services, but to use law and other tools--economic and
sociological analysis, for example-to achieve a more equitable
society. In the words of a CLEP report, the aim is to create "an,
infrastructure of laws, rights, enforcement, and adjudication." For
CLEP and adherents of this project, this "is not an academic
project, of interest to political scientists and social engineers. The
establishment of such institutions can spell the difference between
vulnerability and security, desperation and dignity, for hundreds of
See, supra note 53.
See Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 269.
80 To be sure, there are differences of opinion between legal empowerment
thinkers generally and the CLEP Report. For instance, a leading legal
empowerment theorists, Stephen Golub, has been critical of CLEP. See Stephen
Golub, The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: One Big Step
Forwardand a Few Steps Back for Development Policy and Practice, 1 HAGUE
J. ON RULE L. 101 (2009); see also Stephen Golub, The Legal Empowerment
Alternative, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE 161-82 (Thomas Carothers, ed. 2006).
78
79
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81
millions of our fellow human beings." Thus, legal empowerment
involves a commitment to development, broadly construed. In the
process, legal empowerment theorists explicitly seek to blur the
lines between professional roles. Lawyers must conceive of
themselves more broadly as sociologists, social workers, and
community service providers, while social science professionals,
82
conversely, must begin to conceive of themselves as legal agents.
Under this theoretical position, all social actors need to commit
themselves to changing the lives of the world's poor majority
through legal empowerment.
To be sure, what exactly "legal empowerment" means can be
confounding. For advocates of this position, "empowerment" is
about securing a wide menu of rights-political, civil, social, and
economic-such that "out of familiar and established principles,
comes a radical agenda of legal empowerment, not a technical fix,
83
It is the effort for
but an agenda for fundamental reform."
approaches
top-down
expensive,
rejects
that
reform"
"fundamental
like the top-down, law-focused approach examined above. Instead,
"[t]he concept ... brings together a range of alternative approaches
to promoting access to justice that have been developed largely in
response to discontent with rule-of-law and law-and-development
approaches." 84 The method is to promote "the use of legal services
to increase
activities
development
related
[other]
and
85
disadvantaged populations' control over their lives."
Early proponents of this view articulated a broad and

81 CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3, at preface; see also Barendrecht & de
Langen, supra note 3, at 268-69; THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL
REVIEW, v. 4: LEGAL INNOVATION AND EMPOWERMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 3435 (Hassane Ciss6 et al., eds., 2013).
82 As one prominent adherent of this view has written: "The upshot for [rule
of law, or] ROL development practitioners is that they need to think less like
lawyers and more like agents of social change. Conversely, development
practitioners in other fields could benefit from thinking a bit more like lawyers
and human rights advocates. These dual changes in perspective will open up
vistas for using law to make a greater contribution to development, breaching the
programmatic isolation represented by ROL orthodoxy." Stephen Golub, Beyond
Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative 3 (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper No. 41, 2003) [hereinafter
Golub, Beyond Rule ofLaw Orthodoxy].
83 CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3, at 20.
84 Barendrecht & de Langen, supranote 3, at 261-62.
85 Id. at 262 (quoting Golub, Beyond Rule ofLaw Orthodoxy, supra note 82,
at 25).
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aggressive reform agenda. 6 In particular, the agenda focused on
reform of property, labor, and business enterprise rights and
rules.8 7 CLEP's deliberations focused specifically on using legal
reforms to reduce poverty. Access to justice therefore involves
using law to craft an economic strategy with three elements: "1)
adopting a legal perspective on the economy at the micro-level[,]
2) adopting an economic perspective to supplying law at the micro
level[, and] 3) taking a realistic approach to the law and the
economy."" What is key here is the rejection of a belief that
justice is accessed exclusively via legal institutions. Instead, this
position maintains that access to justice can occur at local, "micro"
levels. The justice to be accessed in this conception can mean, for
example, working under a set of predictable rules in interactions
with a landlord so that you and your family can live secure in the
knowledge that you will not be displaced, or getting a license to
practice your trade with no difficulty and at an affordable price.
In addition, this position dramatically shifts the roles of
formal legal actors and institutions. Specifically:
Legal empowerment differs from ROL orthodoxy in at least
four additional ways: (1) attorneys support the poor as partners,
instead of dominating them as proprietors of expertise; (2) the
disadvantaged play a role in setting priorities, rather than
government officials and donor personnel dictating the agenda;
(3) addressing these priorities frequently involves nonjudicial
strategies that transcend narrow notions of legal systems, justice
sectors, and institution building; (4) even more broadly, the use
of law is often just part of integrated strategies that include
other development activities. 89
In this way, the advocates of legal empowerment theory advance
the view that "[1]egal empowerment both advances and transcends
86 Stephen Golub, for example, while rejecting what has been described as
the "state-centric, justice-sector-focused, and lawyer-dominated, rule-of-law
orthodoxy" argued for implementing measures that would 1) strengthen the
capacities and power of the disadvantaged, 2) select issues of importance to them
(and with them), 3) focus on broader social, legal, and administrative factors
affecting their lives and not just justice sector activities, 4) support civil society
and 5) work in a context-sensitive manner to respect and support local ideas and
initiatives. Id. Carfield discusses the indebtedness of this position to development
theories such as the capabilities approach associated with thinkers like Amartya
Sen and Martha Nussbaum. See Carfield, supra note 60, at 357-58.
87 See Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 251.
88 See id. at 263.
89 Golub, Beyond Rule ofLaw Orthodoxy, supra note 82, at 6.
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the rule of law." 90 With its broad-based, participatory, grassroots
approach, the legal empowerment theory aims to change the
circumstances of millions, if not billions, of people by using law as
an equitable means for achieving the end of greater political,
social, economic, and legal equality. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
approach remains a work in progress, as its advocates seek to build
a model that can be copied and applied in different
circumstances. 9 1
One formulation of the role of law in the construction of this
theory cites the need for four basic elements to provide justice:
A setting in which a dispute or a need for protection can be
discussed and solutions can be negotiated; [p]rinciples, rules,
criteria or schedules that guide the outcomes of discussion; [a]
(neutral) person who can decide on outcomes, particularly if the
disputants are not able to settle their differences; [s]ufficient
incentives for the disputants to live up to the outcome that is
reached through settlement or neutral decision. 92
Simply put, the legal empowerment movement seeks to shape
social structures that mimic many of the principles and aims of
judicial and legal systems (resolution forums, agreed rules,
impartial decision makers, and respect for impartially determined
results). But it seeks to do so without insisting upon an elaborate
institutional architecture of a given design with specified values
that a law-centric, top-down theory requires with, inter alia, its
insistence on expensive professional training and elaborate
substantive and procedural requirements. In other words, this is a
theory that aims to mimic the values of social (or community)
consensus and order that legal and judicial systems require without
the resource-intensive features of such systems, but with the added
likelihood that those features also support differences of social,
political, and economic power.
Even in its relatively young formulation, the legal
empowerment theory has much to recommend if the goal of an
access to justice theory is to expand the range of people and
matters for which justice can be accessed. At least six benefits of
this theoretical position can be identified.
First, the theory serves to consolidate social and political

90 Id. at 9.
91 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 81, at 40-45.

92

Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 265.
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consensus, recognizing the value in solidifying, defending, and
articulating local norms and experience. Even those who defend
the law-centric, top-down access to justice theory described above
have long recognized the importance of legal activities on a local
level: "[A] large number of thoughtful proponents of conciliation
in both Europe and North America argue for the necessity of
decentralized, independent, voluntary institutions capable of
building local unity at the same time they resolve disputes through
conciliation."" Second, and relatedly, the legal empowerment
theory seeks to not only spur consolidation of social and political
norms but also to advance economic development in the process.94
Third, the changing character of democratic governance
globally suggests that this is a propitious moment to try and
introduce such efforts. The paradigm for democratic governance
has, as Gargarella and others have noted, been expanding
worldwide in recent decades, resulting in a call for increased
defense of social rights.9 5 Since the social rights that need be
protected can vary depending on location, a more localized
approach-as advocated by legal empowerment theory-may have
widespread appeal. Fourth, and relatedly, in light of the expanded
paradigm for democratic governance, there now exist across the
world constituencies who favor the transformative power of law to
protect rights.9 6 Importantly, these constituencies do not always
insist on top-down approaches, but often prefer more localized
approaches. 97
Fifth, in a world of staggering inequality in social, economic,
and political power, the legal empowerment approach seeks

93 Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 249.
94 See Golub, Beyond Rule ofLaw Orthodoxy, supra note 82, at 37-38.
95 See generally Gargarella,supra note 40.
96 See Javier A. Couso, The Challenging Role of Law and Courts in Latin
America: From an Obstacle to Social Change to a Tool of Social Equity, in
COURTS

AND

SOCIAL

TRANSFORMATION

IN

NEW

DEMOCRACIES:

AN

INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? 68-71 (Roberto Gargarella et al., eds.,
2006).
97 See, e.g., Bina Agarwal, Toward ParticipatoryInclusion: A Gender
Analysis of Community Forestry in South Asia, in THE STATE OF ACCESS:
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF DEMOCRACIES TO CREATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 37-

38 (Jorrit de Jong and Gowher Rizvi, eds., 2008) (on challenges of achieving
widespread inclusion even when there has been devolution of power at local
level); Lista, in EL ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA, supra note 1, at 15 (describing one
view of justice access as focusing on context and substantive circumstances).
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equitable redistribution of all of those resources. 98 This is a point
that once again reflects the overlap between the theoretical
positions described here; even those who advocate law-centered,
top-down access to justice theories recognize the fundamental
importance of this goal. 99
Sixth, and finally, the legal empowerment theory has the
advantage of being realistic. It does not create aspirational models
that only the richest or best-ordered societies can achieve. Instead,
the legal empowerment theory recognizes that using law as a
mechanism to promote transformative social, political, and
economic change is a time-intensive, long-term project. For the
legal empowerment theorists, in short, one size does not fit all
situations.' 00
However, the successful realization of the legal empowerment
theory for access to justice is not without challenges. Indeed, one
can identify as many areas of concern as benefits of the theory.
The following discussion identifies nine different ways in which
the further refinement of the theory will require dedication and
effort for it to succeed.
First, classic formulations of the theory of democratic
governance contemplate an established judicial and legal system in
which the gatekeepers-lawyers, judges, and administrative
0 1 To the
staff-oversee the smooth functioning of the system.
extent that expectations can shape institutional design, the legal
empowerment theory may be difficult to operationalize because it
is a less formal way of resolving disputes, which could make some
skeptical of its ability to secure just results on a large scale without
the classic gatekeepers in place.
Second, the CLEP and other proposals advocate working at
the grassroots level to develop their proposals, but in fact rely

98 See CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3, at 68, 80-81.
99 See Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 248.
100 See Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 266-67 (noting that the
legal empowerment approach, in contrast to many other law and development
practices, "focuses on the economy as it really is, not as models describe it, and
on the law as it really works in practice, not as it appears on the books."). The
approach takes a realistic long-term view to transformative social change. See id.
at 269; see also Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy, supra note 82, at 38
(observing that there are "many locally determined ways of undertaking" legal
reforms).
101 See, e.g., Gargarella,supra note 40, at 13-29.
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heavily on top-down techniques. 10 2 CLEP's reports can, at times,
speak rather patronizingly about what the poor "need." 03
Furthermore, it is important to realize that the reports are written
not by the poor, but by professionals committed to the CLEP
approach. 104
Consequently, and third, the legal empowerment theory may
in the end be unable to avoid the exact outcome it criticizes. Even
its proponents acknowledge the challenges of widely
operationalizing the legal empowerment access to justice
approach. Barendrecht and de Langen, for example, cite six
barriers to achieving justice using legal empowerment instead of
more traditional, formalistic models (namely "geographical,
financial, and language barriers, complexity, cultural norms, and
delays"). They also cite what they call two "mechanisms of
exclusion:" gatekeepers opposed to the efforts and uncertainty
about the law. These are massive concerns and powerful inhibitors
to change in much, if not most, of the world."0 s
Furthermore, and fourth, legal empowerment casts the net so
widely as to the kinds of rights which must be provided in order to
achieve justice that it may risk failure due to its lack of a defined
theory about which there is a clear consensus as to what goals must
be secured, and in what order. As de Langen and Barendrecht
observe in a generally sympathetic assessment of the potential for
legal empowerment success: "[h]owever, a promising approach
does not yet constitute a feasible strategy. Translating the approach
into concrete programs and getting the implementation right will
be crucial. It is also difficult, because of weak incentives in a
setting of conflicting interests." 0 6 Indeed, as Linn Hammergren
102 This is to note the irony that while CLEP insists it is advocating a
"bottom-up" strategy, in fact CLEP itself is constituted of people from the
highest level of government, international civil society and economic institutions
who lay out the steps for implementation of its agenda and for its appropriate
legal role. See CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3, at 76-89. Moreover, it merits
highlighting van Rooij's observation that legal empowerment theory is not novel
at all, but merely a reiteration of long-established ideas and trends in law and
development practice. See Van Rooij, supra note 53, at 310-12.
103 See, e.g., Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Making
the Law Work for Everyone, v. 2 (2008) [hereinafter CLEP Report v. 2], at 77.
104 See THE WORLD BANK, supranote 81, at 35-40.
105 See Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 258.
106 Id. at 269. CLEP, for its part, tends to glide over the potential for and
reality of conflict, with little attention to the careful strategizing called for by
those like de Langen and Barendrecht. See, e.g., CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3,
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has written in a consideration of access to justice in the context of
Latin American judicial services, there are serious concerns, not
least budgetary, in assuming that more legal services will result in
better justice. Hammergren writes: "When the fundamental right of
access to justice becomes equated with the absolute right of court
use, the public good itself may be endangered. The service
providers lose all control over what is delivered and with it their
ability to direct resources into the most socially productive
channels." As she further observes, once "physical, financial,
operational and attitudinal barriers are removed," new challenges
will surely arise.10 7 Hammergren's critique of the failure to engage
in priority-setting in the context of judicial services is equally true
for legal empowerment's broad and unstructured promises.
Relatedly, and fifth, at this stage it is unclear whether legal
empowerment theory will be inhibited by the same concerns about
crippling resource commitments that bedevil the widespread
imitation of developed country legal and judicial systems. For
example, legal empowerment theory, with its grassroots focus,
advocates admirable measures like public "awareness raising" and
more robust efforts to make useful information available to people
as they seek to defend their interests. 0 8 Doing so on a widespread
scale, however, takes time and money. It is fine to speak of the
09
importance of focusing on the "demand side" of microjustice.1
But that is not a cost-free proposition. People need to be educated
(including having basic literacy to be able to process the
information) about what their demands can be, and how to satisfy
them. The legal empowerment literature is frustratingly vague on
the potential costs of these efforts, and lacks detailed proposals on
achieving these goals with low-cost efforts.
Moreover, and sixth, the flexibility that now characterizes a
at 40 (suggesting that better property dispute resolution mechanisms will
minimize conflict, without specifying what they might be); see generally CLEP
Report v. 2, supra note 102 (discussing a wide range of dispute resolution
innovations, without assessing their relative merits as compared to one another or
suggesting priorities).
107 HAMMERGREN, EnvisioningReform, supra note 12, at 132. However, it is
worth noting that some theorists-not empowerment theorists-are hopeful that
courts may serve a key role to broker differing interest claims. See, e.g., Couso,
supra note 96, at 68-69.
108 See Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 262 (reviewing the claims
of empowerment theorists).
109 See id. at 265.
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key aspect of legal empowerment theory could be its undoing.
That is, flexibility can also mean a lack of definitional clarity.
Leading advocates of legal empowerment theory, make statements
that can seem damnably vague; for example, Stephen Golub says
that sometimes we need law, and sometimes we do not. 1 o
Explanations like that make no attempt to try and determine what
works and what does not. To be sure, there are those who are
working to provide greater focus by, for example, developing
metrics for successful examples of legal empowerment to be able
to improve its effectiveness."' A valid criticism of the legal
empowerment theory, therefore, is that it is unfocused, which
results in a lack of clarity regarding its purpose and operation.
Seventh, and equally worrying, due to this vagueness of
purpose and content, legal empowerment risks trying to be all
things to all people, which may be an open invitation to abuse.
Defenders of more traditional, law-centered, top-down access to
justice theories worry about the consequences of untrained
professionals stepping in to fill roles of the legal service branch.112
With no standards to monitor service failures (the role played by
professional disciplinary bodies, law faculties, and bar
associations, for example), grass-roots "microjustice" providers
might easily become those eager to see uninformed consumers part
with their money. That is, creating a new class of microjustice
gatekeepers does not guarantee that that class will be any more
committed to social equity than their well-heeled counterparts. 1 13
Eighth, and speaking practically, it is well and good to speak
of the need for "realism" in effectuating a legal empowerment
strategy for access to justice that has as its central aim poverty
reduction. But that may mean an extremely slow and incremental
110 See Golub, Beyond Rule ofLaw Orthodoxy, supra note 82, at 41.
111 Carfield, for example, proposes an access to justice index that would
allow assessment of successful initiatives by measuring effectiveness according
to a range of factors. See Carfield, supra note 60, at 359-60. However,
successful implementation may be easier said than done. While promising efforts
are underway, "access to justice is hard to measure and data . . are scarce." See
de Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 251.
112 See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 35.
113 See Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 268. But see, e.g., Jackie
Dugard & Katherine Drage, "To Whom Do People Take Their Issues?:" The
Contribution of Community-Based Paralegals to Access to Justice in South
Africa 21-22 (Justice & Dev. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21, 2013)
(finding that when paralegals were given sufficient independence, they made
significant inroads in expanding legal services for the poor).
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process. Theories tend to be hard to sustain as practice guides over
very long periods, as they change and mutate. As a result, "legal
empowerment" could become a buzz phrase that ends up being
diluted from overuse and abuse.
Ninth and finally, the emphasis on law as a tool for poverty
reduction relies on an untested assumption that law will make the
difference. Yet this runs counter to longstanding debates in
development theory and practice, which continues to struggle with
the question of priorities: should a legal system be the priority?
Why not health? Education? Employment? CLEP, for example,
maintains that these priorities cannot be reliably provided without
strong legal structures.1 14 But there are notable examples where
this is not the case-in the People's Republic of China, for
example, legal empowerment was not central to the national
project, but social and economic (if not political) conditions
improved dramatically for a substantial portion of the
population." In short, it remains for legal empowerment theorists
to make its empirical, and not merely its rhetorical, case.
Integratedbut Not RequiringLaw
The fourth position examined here does not dismiss law by
any means. But it is a theoretical position that does not necessarily
require law to achieve justice, unlike those discussed above. That
is, for this theoretical position, justice is achieved when resources
and social and economic opportunities are distributed equitably
and managed efficiently. Thus, access to justice depends upon
responding in a deliberate fashion to the most pressing social and
economic needs in any given situation. To be clear, I am referring
here to thinkers who would not, I think, self-identify as access to
justice theorists. However, my suggestion is that access to justice
is a central element implied by their work. Theorists who advocate
this position are those whose work has examined situations where
rule systems have been put in place and disputes have been
successfully resolved without recourse to, or the creation of, statesponsored and developed legal and judicial systems.
Moreover, unlike the three justice access theories considered
D.

114 See CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3, at 25-39.
115 See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad-the
Problem of Knowledge 6 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Working Paper No. 34, 2003).
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above, whose proponents tend to share ideological interests in
equity and equality typically associated with the ideological left,
that is not true with the position I am calling "integrated but not
requiring law." Indeed, this theoretical position unites thinkers
across the ideological spectrum. Consider the work of conservative
legal scholar Robert Ellickson, who examined the successful
management of cattle range lands in northern California by
ranchers without recourse to any legal system.11 6 Similarly, a less
conservative writer, the anthropologist James Acheson, studied the
practices of Maine lobstermen to regulate their livelihoods without
involving lawyers, tribunals, or any of the other trappings that
characterize legal systems.11 7 Perhaps best known of all in this vein
is the pioneering work of the economist Elinor Ostrom, whose
work on commons theory explores various circumstances in which
stakeholders interested in the management of a resource over time
develop means to cooperate and resolve differences without
involving legal actors."' Ostrom's work on the development of
common pool resource (CPR) management institutions is a case in
point, in which she demonstrated the ability of non-legal actors to
develop complex rules regulating access to and use of CPRs
including pastureland and water." 9
In contrast to the approaches discussed previously, there are
several attractive features of this theoretical position. First, these
options are low cost. Acheson's lobstermen (and they were all
men), for example, resolved disputes in pairs and small groups,
and even collectively. No one paid filing fees, hired lawyers, or
expended excessive amounts of time in meetings to resolve
problems; the lobstermen managed their fishery via non-legal selfgovernance.' 2 0 The same was true of Ellickson's California cattle
ranchers.121
Second, and of equal appeal, is the fact that these examples
116 See generally ROBERT M. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1994).
1'7 See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE

(1988).
118 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).

THE

119 See id. at 58-88.
120 See generally ACHESON, supra note 117 (describing how the lobster gangs
resolved legal questions).
121 See ELLICKSON, supra note 116, at 167-229 (on development of norms
for resource regulation).
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were less conflictual. That is, there was a high premium placed by
the parties on resolving disputes to the mutual satisfaction of all,
even when the dispute was very complicated. 12 2 Note that CLEP,
for its part, has indicated a comparable desire to apply a resolutionoriented rather than a conflict-driven model in its legal
empowerment activities.1 23 However, this is easier said than done.
The lack of disruptive conflict characterizing the activities and
decisions of social actors appears to derive from the shared local
interest in the use and protection of a resource. This characteristic
suggests that in terms of establishing normative principles as to
what constitutes justice access, the theoretical position has limited
utility.
Relatedly, these examples all deal, broadly speaking, with the
question of what constitutes access to justice in resource
management situations. It is unclear if justice could be accessed,
much less achieved, through this theory in cases where, for
instance, rent disputes are at issue, pitting people of different
economic and social position against one another, or in a question
of pollution control and reduction that affects very different
stakeholders, from those interested in good human and animal
health to those who want to defend economic interests.1 24 That is,
the examples cited here may feature less conflict and more
consensus, because the affected parties share a common interest
they seek to protect.
Finally, even if normative principles of wide application could
be developed for this theoretical position of access to justice, it is
hard to imagine how a model that rejects a formal state role would
be administered. Gatekeepers can be the source of problems, but
they also keep the trains running on time-or, in this case, the
dispute resolution channels moving.

122 See id. at 205.
123 See generally CLEP Report v. 2, supra note 106.
124 The example of coal mining regulation is a strong one that pits
environmental advocates against those who run and even work in the industryeven when those who work in the coal mining industry have their health and
physical environment negatively affected by the activity, they may nonetheless
support its continuance. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, The Climate Change Battle
Through One Coal Miner's Eyes, N.Y. TIMES: THE DAILY (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/podcasts/the-daily/scott-pruitt-coalmining.html.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

374

N.Y.U ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 26

II. URBAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & ACCESS TO JUSTICE

This Part will examine leading claims to urban and
environmental rights. After establishing the character of such
rights, the Part will explore the relevance of access to justice in the
urban and environmental context.
The world does not lack for urban and environmental law and
regulation. However, in some countries, and for different reasons,
enforcement of and support for the rights created by these laws and
regulations is lacking.125 A common theme in enforcement failures
stems from the complex nature of many urban and environmental
rights claims. While air pollution, for example, can harm millions
in the city of New Delhi (to cite a now infamous example), 126 it
does not do so equally. Moreover, the relation of a factor such as
air pollution to other factors that negatively affect health may be
difficult to disentangle. Thus, the causes and effects are many,
making it a challenge, at best, to apportion fault. As a result, the
collective and diffuse nature of the rights demanding protection
often leaves them with no recognized legal defenders. 12 7
A.

Rights Claims
In our highly industrialized, urbanized world, in which the
global population continues to grow at exponential rates, 128 there
125 The situation in countries as different from one another as Brazil and
Pakistan is typical of much of the developing world. See, e.g., ClearerPicture
Emerging Over Brazil's Mining Disaster, DEUTSCE WELLE (Ger.) (Jan. 27,

2016),
http://www.dw.com/en/clearer-picture-emerging-over-brazils-miningdisaster/a-19006554 (quoting a UN official maintaining, inter alia, "that
regulation in Brazil's mining sector is adequate more in theory than in practice,
and that enforcement is lacking."); Sonia Malik, Environmental Tribunal: Only
15% of Cases Decided, 20% Fines Recovered, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Pak.) (June 3,
2012),
http://tribune.com.pk/story/387884/environmental-tribunal-only-15-ofcases-decided-20-of-fines-recovered/.
126 See, e.g., Ellen Barry, Smog Chokes Delhi, Leaving Residents 'Cowering
by Our Air Purifiers', N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/08/world/asia/india-delhi-smog.html (citing levels of some air pollutants
from diverse sources as high as 16 times the legal limit).
127 But see Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on Group Litigation in
Comparative Perspective, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 405, 412 (2001)
(recounting increase in number of actions to protect collective and diffuse
interests across the world). See also, e.g., infra note 162 and accompanying text.
128

World Population Trends, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND (Jan. 31,

2017), http://www.unfpa.org/world-population-trends (reporting, inter alia, that
in the world's least economically development countries, population is expected
to double in the next 50 years); see also UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND,
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are reasons to worry about the quality of the places in which most
people spend their lives. Indeed, there is no shortage of urban and
environmental problems to tackle. And while there are, of course,
localized and distinct problems, it is also possible to note problems
and challenges that are much the same everywhere despite
differences of geography, socioeconomic conditions, and culture.
The list includes, for example: the effects of climate change,
notably from sea level rise and changed weather conditions; 129
infrastructure challenges, particularly in the areas of housing,
130 and
transport, sanitation, and the provision of potable water;
public security. Furthermore, available evidence suggests that
many governments either will not or cannot, on their own, identify
and tackle the various ways in which these problems affect the
lives of their populations. 13 1 The proposition advanced here is that
all of us have certain rights that merit protecting by virtue of living
in cities and physical environments and that these rights are often
negatively affected by anthropogenic activities. What follows in
this Part is, therefore, a brief review of the principal frameworks
used to identify and discuss such urban and environmental rights.
Urban Growth and Urban Rights
Globally, urban growth continues unabated. As the United
Nations observed: "In 2008, the world reache[d] an invisible but
momentous milestone: For the first time in history, more than half
its human population, 3.3 billion people, will be living in urban
32
areas. By 2030, this is expected to swell to almost 5 billion."1
The majority of this growth, moreover, will occur in some of the
world's poorest areas, including sub-Saharan Africa, south Asia,
and southeast Asia. 13 3 Of the planet's majority urban dwellers,
moreover, two out of five are expected to be living in "precarious"
housing situations, creating conditions that no free housing market
B.

UNFPA STATE OF WORLD POPULATION: UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF URBAN
GROWTH 1 (2007) (reporting that in the 2 0 th century the world population
increased from 220 million to 2.8 billion) [hereinafter UNFPA].
129 See, e.g., The Consequences of Climate Change, NAT'L AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMIN., https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/(last visited June 11, 2017).
130 See, e.g., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BRIDGING GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS,
(2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and infrastructure/
our-insights/bridging-global-infrastructure-gaps.
131 See infra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
132 UNFPA, supra note 128, at 1.
133 See id.
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could keep up with. 134 Making the challenges even greater is the
fact that much of this unplanned and unregulated-or, in the
language of development studies, "informal"-growth will form
into the expansion of mega-slums, where the challenges of
providing for services such as sanitation, water, health, and
mobility will be evermore pressing. 135
Not surprisingly, research shows that these circumstances
create concerns for the people who live in these conditions. For the
world's poor majority, in fact, "protection of property rights,
particularly rights to land and housing" is one of the three leading
causes of concern.13 6 This comes as no surprise to observers of
urban change globally. This fact must be coupled with the
recognition that, in many, if not most, of the places that these
people live, individuals cannot rely upon the administrative state to
initiate actions to defend them against harms of wide-reaching
effect.1 37 Moreover, in many such cases, the population is legally
134 Agnes
Deboulet,
Introduction to
AGENCE
FRANCAISE
DE
DEVELOPPEMENT, RETHINKING PRECARIOUS NEIGHBORHOODS 9 (Agnbs Deboulet

ed., 2016). "Precarious" housing refers to the improvised and unstable slum
conditions in which millions live globally, often located in environmentally
unstable situations. As Janice Perlman described, discussing the Brazilian
context, many such housing situations "have evolved over the years from 'jerrybuilt shacks' of wood or wattle and daub to brick-and-mortar dwellings several
stories high... [M]any are built on hillsides, tidal marshes, garbage dumps or
other undesirable spots. . . ." JANICE PERLMAN, FAVELA: FOUR DECADES OF
LIVING ON THE EDGE IN RIO DE JANEIRO 29 (2010).
135 Id. at 16, 25; see also Janice Perlman, Rethinking Precarious
Neighborhoods: Concepts and Consequences of Marginality, in RETHINKING
PRECARIOUS NEIGHBORHOODS 39.
136 Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 250-71. The other two are
personal security and the relationship issues of family and work. Id. at 252.
137 A good example of this is Brazil's worst environmental tragedy, the
Samarco disaster, in which toxic mud was released from a mining operation,
inundating several towns, resulting in fatalities, injuries, and a host of other
negative externalities. More than two years after the event, most of those affected
had received little to no assistance and the environmental consequences remained
largely unidentified, despite the fact that Brazil has, on paper, a robust and
thoughtful environmental regulatory control system for toxics. On the
administrative and judicial delays, see, for example, Ana Lucia Azevedo, Dois
Anos Depois de Tragddia, Vitimas de Mariana Aguardam Indenizagaes [Two
Years After the Mariana Tragedy, Victims Await Indemnities], 0 GLOBO, Nov.
29, 2017, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/dois-anos-depois-de-tragedia-vitimasde-mariana-aguardam-indenizacoes-22006567;
see also Ananda Martins
Carvalho, No Rio Doce, Dois Anos de Violdncia e Luta [In the Rio Doce, Two
Years of Violence and Struggle], LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Nov. 23, 2017,
http://diplomatique.org.br/dois-anos-de-violencia-e-luta-no-rio-doce-samarco/;
see also Marcelo Leite, Reparagdo Social e Mais Desafiadoraque Recuperagdo
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uninformed and unaware of their rights.138 The juxtaposition of
these factors suggests an urgent need to depend on responses other
than those that may already be available in better functioning
democracies and, in turn, to rethink the agencies available to help
defend those unaccustomed to fighting for their rights. For these
reasons, I turn now to a consideration of rights that deserve
attention, the mechanisms that help to achieve the rights, and the
services that provide them.
The Right to the City
There have been calls for increased attention to the rights of
those who are moving to cities and all that cities promise for future
generations. These calls have focused on the fact that those who
come to cities for employment, freedom, better health, and
education, among other factors, are also those who, by their labor,
turn cities into engines of economic growth and social
transformation. Beginning in the late 1960s, most notably, the
French Marxist philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre
articulated his now famous call for a "right to the city," a notion
that would serve the interests of all, including those most excluded
from urban social, economic, and political benefits. 139 The concept
of a "right to the city" sought to promote inclusion in the broadest
sense for all urban inhabitants in political, economic, and social
terms. Furthermore, although much of his writing on cities remains
at a high level of abstraction, Lefebvre's formulation did not
ignore the need to give concrete expression to this right by
promoting equal access to city services and benefits. 1 40
1.

&

de Ambiente em MG [SocialReparation is More Challengingthan Recuperation of
the Environment in Minas Gerais], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Nov. 11, 2017,
http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2017/11/1932953-reparacao-social-superarecuperacao-de-ambiente-poluido-em-mariana-mg.shtml. The government has
asserted, not unreasonably, that Brazil has one of the most expansive regulatory
apparatuses to avoid environmental harm in the world. Brazilian laws and
regulations to address such situations exist, at least on paper. See Governo do
Brasil, Legislaglo ambiental no Brasil 6 uma das mais completas do mundo,
http://www.brasil.gov.br/meio-ambiente/2010/10/legislacao (last visited Feb. 17,
2018) (detailing a range of laws and regulations to impede harm, including
environmental licensing and environmental crimes rules).
138 See CLEP Report v. 1, supra note 3, at 30-45; cf UNDP STRATEGY,
supra note 29, at 51 n.69 (suggesting the importance of grassroots empowerment
for, inter alia, legal knowledge).
139 HENRI LEFEBVRE, WRITINGS ON CITIES 147-59 (Eleonore Kofman
Elizabeth Lebas eds. & trans., 1999).
140 Id. at 154-55 (speaking of the need for what Lefebvre called "mature
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The concept of the right to the city has had broad reception.
At the World Urban Forum that began in the 2000s, for example, a
World Charter for the Right to the City began to circulate, calling
for recognition of the right to the city and illustrating the beginning
of the global support for the right. 14 1
a.

Brazil's City Statute and the Right to the City

In legal terms, the right to the city has arguably gained no
more forceful expression than in Brazil's 2001 City Statute. 1 42 As
an early Brazilian commentator noted:
The City Statute deals with much more than urban land. With
its holistic approach, the law covers the following areas:
guidelines and precepts concerned with urban planning and
plans; urban management; state, fiscal and legal regulation
(particularly referring to landed property and real estate); tenure
regularisation of informal properties; and social participation in
the elaboration of plans, budgets, complementary laws and
urban management, [and public-private partnerships]. 143
And as Ed6sio Fernandes has reminded us, its passage needs, in
the Brazilian context, to be understood against the background of
the unfulfilled legal promise that property comply not just with the
wishes of individual owners, but also with its "social function," a
Brazilian constitutional requirement since 1934.14 In other words,
the City Statute represented an important iteration in an ongoing
effort to clarify the rights of Brazil's poor and working classes
who have traditionally not shared in the country's wealth. As the
planning projects").
141 See Francesca Perry, Right to the City: Can This Growing Social Movement
Win Over City Officials?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.
theguardian.com/cities/2016/apr/I 9/right-city-social-movement-transforming-urbanspace.
142 See Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U] de 11.7.2001 (Braz.) (Law 10.257 of July 10, 2001).
143 Erminia Maricato, The Statute of the Peripheral City, in THE CITY
STATUTE OF BRAZIL:

A

COMMENTARY

5-6 (Celso Santos Carvalho & Anaclaudia

Rossbach eds., Sio Paulo: Cities Alliance & Ministry of Cities 2010) (official
English translation with commentaries).
144 Ed6sio Fernandes, The City Statute and the Urban-Legal Order, in THE
CITY STATUTE: A COMMENTARY 55, 56, 61 (2010). The "social function" notion
was first articulated by the French legal philosopher Ieon Duguit, in a series of
lectures delivered in Buenos Aires in 1911 and later collected and published as
LEON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE, 38-40 (Frida Laski & Harold Laski
trans., 1921) (establishing that the "social function" is a characteristic of public
law generally).
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country has become one of the most densely urbanized in the
world,14 5 this population's potential needs and demands are ever
more evident.14 6
In terms of access to justice, what is striking about the City
Statute is what it does not provide. For instance, although at the
outset it speaks of the importance of "democratic administration"
of Brazilian cities, 147 that is to be accomplished under the terms of
the statute mostly by means of local, state, and national planning
activities.14 8 That is, the statute's focus is on administration and
procedure rather than on the provision of a concrete expression of
a robust notion of democratic governance. If a right is denied or
not supplied, a citizen has no ready means to access to justice in
order to resolve the claim.
To be sure, the City Statute by no means ignores a conception
of participatory democracy and, in turn, access to justice. Article
43 deals with the need to "guarantee the democratic administration
of the city" and to that end provides many participatory
instruments, including: "I - urban policy counsels, at the national,
state and municipal levels; II - debates, hearings and public
consultations; III - conferences on subjects of urban interest, at the
national, state and municipal level; IV - popular initiatives related
to bills of law, plans, programmes and urban development
projects .. ."149 Article 44, in turn, requires some form of
participatory budgeting, which is understood to "mean conducting
debates, hearings and public consultations about the proposals of
the multi-annual plan, the budget guidelines law and the annual
budget as a mandatory condition prior to their approval by the City
Chamber.""so Finally, Article 45 provides that regional and local
145 See THE WORLD BANK, Urban Population, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS (last visited June 11, 2017) (reporting that in
2016, nearly 86% of the Brazilian population was urban).
146 See generally PERLMAN, supra note 134.
147 Lei No. 10.257, Art. 2(11), de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U] de 11.7.2001 (Braz.).
148 See id. at ch. IV.
149 Id. at art. 43.
150 Id. at art. 44; see also, e.g., Leonardo Avritzer, DemocraticInnovation and
SocialParticpationin Brail, 9 J.DEMOCRACY 153-70 (2013) [hereinafter Avritzer 2013];
LEONARDO AVRTIZER, PARTICPATORY INSTmIONs IN DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL (2009).
Participatory budgeting, which is now practiced across the world, started in the Brazilian city
of Porto Alegre in 1990 and has been lauded as a successful model of a form of direct
democracy, see generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, DEMOCRATIZING
DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CANON (2007).
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"administrative entities" must "assure the compulsory and
substantive participation of the population and of associations
representing different segments of the community in order to
guarantee to them direct control of administrative activities as well
as assuring the population of complete exercise of citizenship.""s'
Unquestionably, then, the City Statute does envision an active and
engaged role for citizens in urban management.
When one takes a step back and examines the actual form that
participation is meant to take, however, it is impossible to escape
the recognition that the statute expresses an elitist vision of
participatory democracy. That is, it is a circumscribed vision of
participation, in which change is processed through levels of
administration. Imagine, for example, a citizen in a Brazilian city
who fails to receive potable water while other, better-heeled
citizens are receiving the service. The City Statute provides no
direct mechanism to access justice in order to seek redress. While
there are cases finding failures of compliance with the City Statute,
they tend to be actions brought by large interests, including state
actors, and not by individuals.1 52 Indeed, the sorts of actions that
may be brought under Brazilian law in order to assert violations of
rights assured by the City Statute are limited to very restricted
classes, from the President of the Republic, to the Brazilian
equivalent of the American Bar Association and labor unions.
Notably, there is no personal standing to assert a claim under the
statute for ordinary Brazilian citizens. 15 3
As a result, while one can say that the City Statute
contemplates an engaged citizenry in the articulation of its urban
needs and aspirations, it lacks corresponding access to justice
151 Lei No. 10.257, Art. 45, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DiARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U] de 11.7.2001 (Braz.).
152 See Colin Crawford, A Fungdo Social da Propriedade e o Direito a
Cidade: Teoria e PraticaAtual, 41 app. A. 1, Boletim do Instituto de Pesquisa
Econ6mica Aplicada (IPEA), Texto para discussso 2882 (Mar. 2017),
http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id
=29721&catid=397&Itemid=419 (appendix detailing Brazilian court treatment of
cases that involved right to the city and other, related urban rights claims).
153 See Lei No. 9.868, de 10 de Novembro de 1999, Didrio Oficial da UniAo
[D.O.U] de 11.11.1999 (Braz.), established a "direct" right for alleged
unconstitutional actions (agdo direita da inconstitutionalidade).Article 2 of that
statute established the class of persons who may bring the action. It is the
principle vehicle for alleging violations of the City Statute, inasmuch as the City
Statute takes its authorization from constitutional provisions. See Crawford,
supra note 152.
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mechanisms when agreed-upon needs are not met, or when
aspirations are satisfied inequitably. This suggests the need for
normative solutions to allow for access to justice to secure the
right to the city and urban living conditions generally.
2.

Rights Claimsfor EnvironmentalHarms andBenefits

The consequences of global industrialization, militarization,
and rapid population growth, accompanied by reduced mortality,
began to take their toll on the physical environment over the
course of the twentieth century. Unsurprisingly then, by the late
1960s, in many quarters of the world there was a push for
increased environmental legislation. In Stockholm in 1972, the
United Nations held its first conference on the human environment
and famously issued a declaration that recognized the urgency of
protecting the human and physical environment. 14
From the outset, the Stockholm Declaration speaks of rights,
including "the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life
of dignity and well-being, and [man] bears a solemn responsibility
to protect and improve the environment for present and future
generations."' The Stockholm Declaration is a non-binding, soft
law document, of course. The point is, however, that the
instrument reflected a widespread sense of urgency, a sentiment
that translated into the laws and regulations in hundreds of
countries. Indeed, I would suggest that the notion in the Stockholm
Declaration that nature itself has rights, also expressed in the 2008
156
Ecuadorian Constitution, is a direct translation of this sentiment.
154 See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declarationof the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1
(Chapter 1) (1972) [Stockholm Declaration].
155 Id.
156 Article 71 of that document provides as follows: "La naturaleza o Pacha
Mama, donde se reproduce y realiza la vida, tiene derecho a que se respete
integralmente su existencia y el mantenimiento y regeneraci6n de sus ciclos
vitales, estructura,funciones y procesos evolutivos." ["Nature, or Pacha Mama,
where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its
existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structures,
functions and evolutionary processes."]. Constituci6n de la Repdblica del
Ecuador, art. 71 (2008). 1 do not mean by this statement to disregard the novelty
that the statement also contains, specifically its reference to the indigenous
cosmovision of Pacha Mama- Mother Earth-and of her importance. What I
am suggesting, however, is that in this and many other charters and laws across
the world since the early 1970s one can now easily find recognition of the
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The point to recognize is that most countries now contain
environmental codes and regulations that, although of differing
degrees of complexity and detail, reflect these concerns. Those
codes and regulations in turn detail promises to deliver clean and
safe physical and built environments.
a.

The Movement for EnvironmentalJustice

With increased regulation of the environment also came
recognition that the distribution of environmental harms and
benefits was inequitable. This recognition, beginning in
approximately the early 1980s, led to what became a global
movement for environmental justice.' 5 7 The basic demand of the
environmental justice movement (simply stated but difficult to
implement) is to more fairly distribute-or, preferably, reduce in
an equitable manner-the harms of industrial and military
activities.' Subsequently, the movement also focused on the need
for more equitable distribution of environment benefits, such as
access to greenspace and recreational opportunities in -the physical
environment.1 5 9 Globally, these ideas gained traction in laws and
regulations. United States President Bill Clinton, for example,
demanded that all United States federal government agencies
engage in environmental justice reviews for their major
activities.16 0 The Colombian Constitution of 1991 requires that
importance of environmental protection. For one exploration of the significance
and limits of the Ecuadorian constitutional provision, see Michelle P. Bassi,
Note, La Naturaleza o Pacha Mama de Ecuador: What Doctrine Should Grant
Trees Standing? 11-OR. REV. INT'LL. 461 (2009).
157 See e.g., VANDANA SHIVA, EARTH DEMOCRACY: JUSTICE, SUSTAINABILITY
AND PEACE (2015); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES IN LEGAL EMPOWERMENT (June 2014); GORDON
WALKER, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTS, EVIDENCE AND POLITICS (2012);
ROBERT EMMET HERNAN, THIS BORROWED EARTH: LESSONS FROM THE FIFTEEN
WORST ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS AROUND THE WORLD (2010); THE LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: THEORIES AND
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS

DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster, eds., 2d ed.,
2009); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT (2001).

158 See, e.g., Philip Weinberg, Equal Protection, in THE LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTS, EVIDENCE AND POLITICS, supra note 157,

at 3-23.
159 See, e.g., Colin Crawford, Environmental Benefits and the Notion
ofPositive Environmental Justice, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 911 (2011).
160 See Executive Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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property serve not only its social purpose, but also its "ecological"
function.161 These are two of many such examples, indicating that
rights have been created to enjoy a healthy human and physical
environment for all.
Rights without Defenders
The concern, however, is that it is much more difficult to
vindicate rights claims for environmental harms and benefits. In
the United States, once looked to as a leader in environmental
protection, standing rules have been dramatically cut back in
recent decades, making it difficult for individuals to challenge
violations that do not cause them direct personal harm.16 2 Those in
the United States and most parts of the world remain reluctant to
1 63
allow aggressive enforcement of collective and diffuse rights.
Elsewhere, even where rights may in theory be vindicated by those
seeking to protect collective or diffuse rights, the weakness of
other sectors-such as a non-profit sector with limited funding
staffed by trained professionals able to assert actions-can inhibit
assertion of these rights. 164
b.

161 The Constitution of the Republic of Colombia provides, in relevant part,
as follows: "La propiedades una funcion social que implica obligaciones. Como
tal, le es inherente una funci6n ecol6gica." ["Property is a social function that
implies obligations. As such, there is inherent to it an ecological function."]
Constitution of the Republic of Colombia, art. 58 (2011).
162 On the development of this limiting standing doctrine, see, e.g.,
Christopher Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business as Usual? Analyzing the
&

Development of Environmental Standing Doctrine Since 1976, 5 HARV. L.

POL'Y REV. 289 (2011). Of course, as recently as the mid-1980s, expanded
standing, not just in the U.S. but elsewhere, appeared to be the developing norm.
See, e.g., Cappelletti et al., supra note 2, at 232-36.
163 For example, while Brazil's 1988 Constitution authorized the Public
of the
Ministry to defend "diffuse and collective interests"-Constitution
Federative Republic of Brazil, art. 129, cl. III (1988)-the choice to do so
remains with the prosecutors, members of an elite legal class. Constitution of the
Federative Republic of Brazil, art. 129, cl. 111 (1988). Individual citizens do not
have individual standing to seek defense of such interests. See Crawford, supra
note 152.
164 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Access to Government in Eastern Europe:
Environmental Policymaking in Hungary, in THE STATE OF ACCESS: SUCCESS
AND FAILURE OF DEMOCRACIES TO CREATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 71 (Jorrit de

Jong and Gowher Rizvi eds., 2008).
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Efforts to EstablishInternationalNorms Relevantfor
Vindicating Urban and EnvironmentalRights

Following the Stockholm Conference, its eponymous
Declaration, and subsequent United Nations and other
multinational conferences on urban and environmental matters, 165
there has been a push to create mechanisms at the international,
regional, and state levels to vindicate urban and environmental
rights. This section will briefly examine what has become the
leading example of such efforts, namely the 1992 United Nations
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters-commonly known as the Aarhus Convention, after the
Danish city where it was signed.' 66 The focus here will be narrow,
considering only the relevance of the Aarhus Convention to access
to justice. The Aarhus Convention is a long and complicated
document and one that has received significant scholarly and other
attention. 167 My aim here is, therefore, to focus simply on the
challenges in turning its terms into concrete mechanisms to defend
individual, collective, and diffuse rights. For purposes of analysis,
the discussion will be restricted to two examples in the region
where Aarhus has arguably received the most attention: the
European Union.
The Aarhus Convention has three basic aims: to ensure that
the public has 1) access to information about matters affecting the
environment; 2) the opportunity to participate in decisions
affecting the environment; and 3) "access to justice in

165 See, e.g., GIONTHER HANDL, DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (STOCKHOLM DECLARATION), 1972
AND THE RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 1992,
AVAILABLE AT UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dunche/dunche.html (last visited June 11, 2017);

see also Peter H. Sand, The Evolution of InternationalEnvironmental Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29, 29

(Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
166 See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation to
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25,
1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Convention on Access to Information].
167 See, e.g., Jonas Ebbesson, Public Participation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 165, at 682702; MARC PALLEMAERTS, THE AARHUS CONVENTION AT TEN: INTERACTIONS
AND TENSIONS BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EU
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2011).
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environmental matters."l 68 In fact, the phrase or a variant of the
phrase "access to justice" appears in nearly every article of the
Aarhus Convention, and Article 9 of the document is devoted
entirely to the subject.
For purposes of this discussion, two provisions in Article 9
are of special interest. First, Article 9 provides that "members of
the public concerned" who have a "sufficient interest or,
alternatively," maintain "impairment of a right" pursuant to
69
relevant national law, shall have "access to a review procedure."l
While the Article recognizes, as it must, that "[w]hat constitutes a
sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be.determined in
accordance with the requirements of national law" it also,
nonetheless, provides that this must be done consistent "with the
17 0
objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice."
Importantly, Article 9 specifies that the public can, for such
purposes, be represented by non-profit organizations (NPOs).
Second, Article 9 provides that parties to the Convention "shall
consider the establishment of appropriate assistance mechanisms
to remove or reduce financial and other barriers to access to

justice."17
Thus, by recognizing the role of civil society actors to defend
the rights of many, the Aarhus Convention acknowledges the
collective and diffuse nature of many environmental rights. This
provides a useful, functional, normative definition in answer to the
question of who can access justice when it comes to environmental
(or, for that matter, urban) matters. Moreover, the Aarhus
Convention also helpfully recognizes the fact of access to justice
barriers, financial and otherwise, again opening an important door
to crafting norms as to what access to justice should mean.
Available evidence suggests, however, that even within the
relatively well-resourced European Union, which acceded to the
Aarhus Convention in 2005,172 these aspirations are not being
fulfilled. This failure persists despite the 2006 passage of a
Convention on Access to Information, supra note 166, at Art. 1.
Id. at art. 9(2)(b).
Id.
Id. at art. 9(5).
The Convention itself entered into force in 2001. For details on the
Convention, see UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Chapter XXVI:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg
Environment,
no=XXVIl-13&chapter-27&clang-_en (last visited June 11, 2017).
168
169
170
171
172
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regulation by the European Parliament and Council , known as the
"Aarhus Regulation," the purpose of which is to facilitate
compliance with the treaty's terms. Hendrik Schoukens has
observed as follows:
EU courts have consistently rebuked pleas for a softening of the
standing requirements in the context of direct actions against
EU acts that might have an impact on the environment and/or
public health. In addition, the internal review procedure set out
by the 2006 Aarhus Regulation has been interpreted so
restrictively by the EU institutions that its added value in the
stride toward better access to courts in environmental matters
remains ephemeral at best. 173
This is not an exaggerated claim. As Schoukens notes, EU courts
continue to apply a 1963 judgment that restricts standing to
persons directly interested in a matter or those who, "by reason of
circumstances," are "differentiated from all other persons." 74 The
effect of such a ruling as applied to a collective or diffuse right is
to dramatically restrict standing, as it requires identifying plaintiffs
who have - suffered particular harms. As in United States
environmental standing jurisprudence, the effect is to discourage
litigation seeking to redress group rights or alter actions that affect
collective and diffuse interests.1 75 One response of the EU courts
has been to argue that their restrictive standing ruling does not
foreclose the possibility of seeking redress in national tribunals.
This has proven something of an empty promise, however, since
standing rules are, in general, even more individually-focused in
national courts, and potential plaintiffs are often limited from
advancing claims for other procedural reasons.17 6
The above is not to say that Article 9 does not hold promise
for continuing to shape notions of access to justice in
environmental (and, by extension, urban) matters. It does suggest,
173 Hendrik Schoukens, Access to Justice in Environmental Cases after the
Rulings of the Court of Justice of 13 January 2015: Ka/7ka Revisited?, 31
UTRECHT J. INT'L & EUROPEAN L. 46, 46 (2015).
174 Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Comm'n of the European Cmty., 1963
E.C.R. 96.
175 1 refer particularly to the steady tightening of the potential for standing to
advance collective interests since the 1980s, notably under the direction of the
late United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. See James E. Pfander,
Scalia'sLegacy: Originalismand Change in the Law of Standing, 6 BRIT. J. AM.
LEGAL STUD.

176

85, 90 (2017).

Schoukens, supranote 173, at 47.
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however, that the significant structural and institutional hurdles
faced by those seeking to expand access to justice in the urban and
environmental realms remain considerable.
III. ACCESSING URBAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

In Part I, I examined leading access to justice theories,
examining both their strengths and their weaknesses. Part II
focused on a different problem entirely, namely the urban and
environmental challenges faced by the world's majority urban
population. Part II thus demonstrated both how a great deal of
energy has been invested to theorize concepts like "the right to the
city" and "environmental justice" and how those theories have
been given concrete expression. Importantly, too, Part II
demonstrated that a challenge for defending the rights of people to
enjoy clean, safe, productive urban environments is that the harms
are often collective and diffuse-which creates challenges for our
traditional notions of who can seek to redress a harm and how to
assess liability.
This Part will offer some thoughts on how those challenges
can begin to be addressed in order to provide access to justice to
large numbers of people experiencing urban and environmental
harms. This Part thus seeks to integrate the issues addressed in the
previous two Parts. It asks what basic steps are necessary to begin
to provide access to justice. In this, the Part does not seek to be
exhaustive, but rather to provide initial thoughts for first steps to
secure access to justice for the four billion individuals living in
often dangerous and unsanitary urban environments. This
discussion will suggest that urban and environmental challenges
should be priorities when seeking to provide justice. If a person
cannot live day-in and day-out in a dignified, healthy environment,
it is hard to fathom how he or she can be a productive, content
member of the society in which he or she exists.
This Part asks, and seeks to explore, two questions. First, it
asks whether the broad label of "access to justice" has a role in
guaranteeing urban and environmental rights. The Part answers
this question in the affirmative and then proceeds to ask, second,
what might constitute important elements of justice in the urban
and environmental context. A standard formulation of access to
justice, for example, provides that "access to justice is the rule of
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law as it works out in practice for individuals.""' However, as the
previous discussion has demonstrated, and as this Part will
continue to show, the focus on individual rights has limited utility
as an organizing concept in the urban and environmental context.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the
collective and diffuse nature of many urban and environmental
rights claims would require us to change our definition of access to
justice.
A.

Access to Justice in the Urban and EnvironmentalContext
Given the magnitude of the urban and environmental (and
often urban-environmental) challenges the world is facing, action
must be taken to address them. Moreover, it would be naive to
suppose that governments alone can or should be responsible for
directing the nature of the response. 178 Therefore, it is essential to
widen the definition of "access to justice" so that more citizens
may actively engage in the search for effective solutions to assure
clean, healthy, and livable cities and physical environments. The
central question addressed by this Article, of course, is how.
In Part I, I identified four theoretical positions seeking to
answer the question of how best to achieve access to justice. Of
these, two can be set aside as impracticable in the urban and
environmental context, at least insofar as the protection of
collective and diffuse rights is concerned. The first position to be
set aside is what was labelled the "law-focused and top-down"
position. As indicated in the discussion above, the proposals from
this camp are so resource-intensive that it would be excessively
optimistic to assume that these models, with their institution-heavy
and cost-intensive proposals, could be replicated to help defend the
rights of the four billion people who now receive little, if any,
justice when they do not have, for instance, potable water or
reliable sanitation. Moreover, it is of concern that this theoretical
position-arguably the leading academic view of access to
justice-is heavy on principle and weak on providing clear metrics
for success or failure; it lacks "substantive evaluation criteria." As
Barendrecht has observed, this
literature talks a lot about effectiveness. Until now, there is
Barendrecht & de Langen, supranote 3, at 254.
Indeed, the conditions in which most people live suggest they cannot. See
generally UNDP STRATEGY, supranote 29.
177
178
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little precision in the criteria for this in the literature. For
instance, there is no agreed and operational definition of
sufficient access to justice. [Deborah Rhode's book, Access to
Justice], [t]he most cited book on access to justice does not
179
contain a clear definition of the concept.
Clearly, if the phrase "access to justice" is to have any meaning,
especially in the large swaths of the world without developed
traditions and systems for access to justice, clear definitions and
precise criteria to measure the success of what has been defined
and implemented are essential.
The second position to be set aside is less helpful for different
reasons. The fourth position presented, labelled "integrated but not
requiring law," has much to recommend. It is less openly
confrontational, characterized more often by dependence on
efficient and comparatively cheap dispute resolution mechanisms
than any of the other positions. However, as also noted in the
discussion, it is a position that works because it is characteristic of
situations in which there is a shared interest in the sustainable
management of one or more natural resources. By definition, this
endeavor unites parties around that goal. By contrast, the kind of
urban or environmental issue that most commonly must be
addressed today-the construction of a cleaner and more efficient
transportation system, for example, or an effort to reduce
contamination of groundwater by mining interests-brings
together stakeholders who do not share the same goal and can
often be highly antagonistic to one another. Consequently, in terms
of widening access to justice, the "integrated but not requiring
law" position cannot be deemed a suitable one to shape normative
articulation for expanded urban and environmental justice access.
That leaves two theoretical positions-what I labelled as the
"law-focused and bottom-up" and "integrated and requiring law"
access to justice positions. Importantly, both positions differ from
the "law-focused and top-down" approach in that their primary
concern is the demand side of justice and not the supply side. For
the four billion who have little to no access to justice, that is
significant. But before considering which position provides a
better theoretical framework for the articulation of urban and
environmental justice norms, four concerns about the content that
any normative framework for expanded urban and environmental

179

Barendrecht, supra note 53, at 300.
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justice should have must be identified.
First, unlike the resource management situations that the
"integrated but not requiring law" position seeks to protect, the
sorts of urban and environmental problems contemplated here are
those of large scale that tend to affect a wide range of interests,
people, and stakeholders. This is to say they will present situations
of conflict. To be effective, the access to justice model will need to
be transparent and clearly defined and organized. Without these
qualities, confidence is likely to be low, impeding success.
Second, the actions contemplated here-and the norms that
will be required to defend them-will often be aimed to achieve
equitable results. This will be especially true in the urban context,
where the dramatic inequality of most world cities today is a
dominant characteristic.' That will mean taking steps that direct
resources from the "haves" (or the have-mores) to the "have-nots"
(or the have-lesses).
Third, a model for expanded urban and environmental access
to justice needs to account for the highly privatized, concentrated,
and problematic nature of land holding in much of the world."s
This situation effectively makes it impossible for millions of
people to have any real prospect of securing land tenure, urban or
rural. 182
It also
makes
infrastructure
expansion
and
improvements-matters that affect the nature of cities and their
physical environments-challenging and difficult. It is unlikely
that those historically excluded from elitist decisions about land
use will be able, without support and assistance, to advance
successful claims.
Fourth and finally, any practicable set of solutions must
acknowledge the limited resources-both in terms of trained
human capital and financial resources-available for the
realization of significantly expanded access to justice in much of
the economically developing world. Barring any political or social
180 See U.N. Human Setttlements Programme, supra note 7, at xxiii ("Among
the most significant challenges that urban planning has to address in the next few
decades, especially in developing countries, are increasing poverty and
inequality, as well as to the rapidly expanding urban informal sector.").
181 See
EDtSIO FERNANDES,
LINCOLN
INST.
OF
LAND
POLICY,
REGULARIZATION OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA 7-8, 14-17

(2011).
182 See generally id.; HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC
ANSWER TO TERRORISM (2008).
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change that will lead to the redistribution of wealth held by global
elites,1 83 most governments have strained budgets ill-equipped to
attend to, must less to pursue, increased demands for access to
justice.1 84
In light of the above factors, the "law-focused and bottom-up"
position is, at least for the present, a much better candidate for
promoting justice access for the four billion largely without it than
the "integrated but requiring law" position associated with the
legal empowerment thinkers. This is so for at least two substantive
reasons.
First, the "law-focused and bottom-up" position advances a
model based on metrics, measures that can be implemented to
chart successes and failures. Barendrecht, for example, has
proposed a model informed by practices in the health care sector.
This method first identifies the legal problems that need attention.
As he notes, work in recent decades has identified similar legal
problems across cultures and societies.' 85 This has the advantage
of comparing methods for addressing particular categories of legal
problems and, one hopes, to develop best practices in the process.
Second, this model emphasizes the importance of
accountability and the need to develop uniform criteria to measure
the accountability of justice actors. 186 This will require, as
Barendrecht and others, including the World Justice Project,
recognize, observing a practice of trial and error. It begins with
basic surveys asking questions like whether the parties involved
87 While such
were satisfied with the results of their dispute.1
surveys are not cost-free, neither are they especially costly and, as
advocates of this form of evidence-based treatment for legal
problems note, similar methods have been used with success
183

See Jorrit de Jong and Gowher Rizvi,

The Dynamics of Access:

Understanding "the Mismatch ", in THE STATE OF ACCESS: SUCCESS AND
FAILURE OF DEMOCRACIES TO CREATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 276 (Jorrit de Jong

& Gowher Rizvi eds., 2008) (noting, for example, "a general decline of
commitment to the social compact and a separation between the discourse on
programs and the discourse on revenues have led public managers to balance
their books strategically by limiting access to public benefits").
184 See de Jong and Rizvi, supra note 16, at 29-31; Barendrecht & de
Langen, supra note 3, at 260-61 (observing the social and economic challenges
facing developing countries).
185 Barendrecht, supra note 53, at 295.
186 See id. at 297-303.
187

See id. at 299-300.
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globally in sectors from health to corrections. 88
With respect to the four concerns noted above applicable to
urban and environmental problems, the above approach is
promising. First, given that there are a wide range of stakeholders,
this evidence-based treatment of legal problems can help provide
better clarity of the factors impeding successful service delivery.
Similarly, and secondly, identifying the gaps in service delivery
will provide more objective bases upon which to justify
reallocation of resources. Third, such surveys will provide
documentation of the limitations of many social actors and
groups--economic, cultural, language, and geographic factors, for
example.' 8 9 In the context of legal problems that are of a collective
and diffuse nature, like many urban and environmental legal
problems, this evidence-based method will permit rethinking the
question of who may assert a claim, and how to represent the
persons and groups whose rights are being denied. Fourth and
finally, evidence-based results are always preferable when
resources are tight, as they provide clear data on how to make
difficult or controversial decisions.
By contrast, the ambitious, but under-theorized approach of
the legal empowerment thinkers, with their "integrated but
requiring law" approach, has less to support it as a workable
model. As de Langen and Barendrecht trenchantly wrote in a
sympathetic, if critical, assessment of this position:
[T]he idea of legal empowerment is broader than strict access to
justice.... [T]he notion of legal empowerment is a more
instrumental perspective on the law, a way of seeing how the
legal system as a whole underpins the functioning of society
and the workings of the economy.1 90
This breadth of focus both constitutes the appeal of, and reveals
the weakness of, this position as a workable one for improving and
expanding access to justice. On the one hand, it focuses forcefully
on the range of factors that impede billions of people from living
healthy, full lives. It looks to local needs and practices as guides
for solutions. On the other hand, it blurs the line between law and
other factors (social organization and the economy, for example)
that shape lives and living conditions, making it nearly impossible
188 See id. at 301.
189 See supra note 113 and accompanying text on the role of gatekeepers.
190 Barendrecht & de Langen, supra note 3, at 263-64.
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to use the approach as a way of making informed choices based on
a consistent set of factors to improve access to justice. Moreover,
with respect to the possible vindication of urban and
environmental rights that are the focus of this Article, the
"integrated but requiring law" position focuses heavily on
questions of property rights,1 9 1 which, while an important part of
the urban and environmental equation, are not the only questions
that matter to those without access to justice.
The "What" and "When" of Urban and
EnvironmentalAccess to Justice
If the goal is for people to be able to live dignified, productive
lives, a significant part of achieving that end is to assure that the
physical and built environments in which they pass their lives are
clean, safe, healthy, and orderly. As documented in this Article,
however, that is rarely the case. Given the often dirty, unsafe, and
unhealthy conditions in which millions of people live the world
over, it would be naive to assume that governments can, or intend
to, reverse this situation. Therefore, it is essential to provide
alternative means for the population to realize notions like the right
to the city and environmental justice. The "law-focused, bottomup" model offers the best candidate to do so, because it is an
approach that consists of measurable metrics, comparative
methods, and an emphasis on accountability constantly evaluated.
However, there remains the problem of how to scale up this
method for the sort of collective and diffuse rights claims that
characterize so many urban and environmental rights claims. To
that end, I suggest that it is necessary to undertake three additional
measures: committing to a robust effort of urban and
environmental education, creating deep and widespread
opportunities for participation in decisions about urban structure,
and providing access to simple pleading and consolidation of
similar claims with relaxed standing requirements.
B.

191 In the case of the CLEP report, this is arguably a consequence of the
influence of CLEP Co-Chair (with Madeleine Albright) Hernando de Soto. This
has been a much-criticized aspect of CLEP's deliberations and products. See,
e.g., van Rooij, supra note 53, at 307 (citing criticisms); Mathew Stephens, The
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: An Opportunity Missed, 1
HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 132, 139-41 (2009) (criticizing de Soto's involvement);
Jan Michael Otto, Rule ofLaw Promotion, Land Tenure and Poverty Alleviation:
Questioning the Assumptions of Hernando de Soto, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 173,
174-75 (2009) (same).
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A key aspect of these measures is that they are relevant for the
expression of collective and diffuse interests. To be sure,
individuals may suffer special urban and environmental harms that
merit redress. However, more than these types of individuated
harms-financial scams or crimes against the person, for
example-the collective and diffuse nature of urban and
environmental harms demands a different response than one
focused merely on individual redress, if justice is to be both
accessed and achieved. 192 These three elements aim to respect the
characteristic features of urban and environmental harms requiring
redress.
1.

Urban and EnvironmentalEducation

This element will require a commitment by global, national,
and local actors to engage in widespread urban and environmental
education,19 3 at the most local level possible, on matters ranging
from the right to the city and environmental justice to the nature of
environmental contamination and the options for improved,
cleaner surroundings. That is, there must be a deep and engaged
commitment to educating the citizenry on matters affecting their
well-being, in language they understand. Evidence suggests that
does not always occur.' 9 4 This is of concern since rights cannot be
asserted if the holders of them are not aware that they are
available. Improving the quality of the built and physical
environment must begin not only with people understanding what
is possible for them and their surroundings, but also with efforts to
understand how their surroundings may fail to be promoting their
wellbeing and best functioning.
192

The challenges of defending diffuse and collective rights have been

widely explored. See, e.g., LAURA GARCIA ALVAREZ, DATiOs AMBIENTALES
TRANSNACCIONALES Y ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA 35-47 (2016).

193

The environmental education literature is vast, but it is also diffuse. See,

e.g., INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL
EDUCATION (Robert B. Stevenson et al. eds., 2012); CHARLES SAYLAN & DANIEL
BLUMSTEIN, THE FAILURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION (AND How WE CAN

Fix IT) (2011). Different institutional actors have elaborate environmental
education programs, such as the United Nations Environmental Programme
Environmental Education and Training Program, information about which is
available at U.N. ENVIRONMENT, Education and Training, http://www.unep.org/
training/ (last visited June 11, 2017). The education imagined here would focus
on the rights that people can have with respect to their environment, and how
they can be actors with a direct voice in the transformation of their environment.
194

SAYLAN & BLUMSTEIN, supra note 193, at 38-56.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

2018]

395

In terms of the theoretical models reviewed in Part I, this sort
of education is not central to the access to justice advocated by
those like Deborah Rhode who advocate the "top-down, lawfocused" approach. As indicated, this approach, while recently
expanding the menu of what measures might help promote justice
access, disproportionately focuses on increasing relatively costly
services from trained professionals.1 95 By contrast, CLEP, and to a
lesser extent the initiatives in Aarhus, contemplate a more engaged
public. This is also true of the "law-focused, bottom-up" theorists,
for whom citizen engagement is key.1 96
However, it must be acknowledged that a commitment to
deep and widespread urban and environmental education would
bear its own significant costs. The approach is time-intensive and
requires political will. Individuals must be trained and then fan out
97
and replicate their training. That is never an easy proposition.1
2.

Participation

Participation is of course a hallmark of the Aarhus
Convention and of CLEP and related legal empowerment theories.
It is not a central facet of the "top-down, law-focused" approach,
except to the extent that that theoretical framework seeks to enable
more individuals to participate in proceedings managed by others
who seek to secure their rights. Perhaps the most celebrated,
successful example of a participatory form of democracy emerged
not in a wealthy, economically and politically developed country,
but in an economically developed country emerging from a
political dictatorship. I refer, of course, to the example of
participatory budgeting that began in southern Brazil in 1990 and
has spread globally since then.' 98 This movement should give us
195 See, e.g. Rhode, A Roadmapfor Reform, supra note 2, at 1241-56.
196 See, e.g., van Rooji, supra note 53, at 304 (noting that "bottom-up
interventions improve[] legal knowledge, economic well-being, gender equality,
land tenure security, and participation") (citing ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT: ADVANCING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND POVERTY

REDUCTION 127-33( 2001)).
197 Anwar Shah explores some

of these challenges in Anwar Shah,

Demanding to Be Served: Holding Governments to Account for Improved
Access, in THE STATE OF ACCESS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF DEMOCRACIES TO

CREATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 207, 219-20 (Jorrit de Jong & Gowher Rizvi
eds., 2008).
198 Participatory budgeting refers to a process whereby a percentage of a
municipal budget is set aside each year and its allocation is decided by some
mechanism that involves the widest possible public involvement. The aim, thus,
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some hope about the potential to increase participation and, in turn,
access to justice. Moreover, it is arguably especially important to
focus on participation as an element of access to justice in urban
and environmental contexts. First, the widescale environmental ills
that characterize so much contemporary urban settlement
demonstrates vividly the absence of state actors.' 99 Therefore, part
of access in the urban and environmental context must mean
inclusion-via a mechanism that can connect state actors and the
previously excluded citizenry. Some form of participation in
decisionmaking, with an eye to produce more regular, healthier
human settlements and environments, will surely enhance access
to justice.
The example of participatory budgeting is thus an important
one to consider. The question is, then, what would participation
look like in the case of urban and environmental decisions? In
response, I suggest that a three-pronged approach, informed by
participatory budgeting, would be useful.
First, the participatory budgeting models developed in Brazil
and modified in many other contexts (places different in culture
and degree of economic development)20 0 could be adapted to
decisionmaking about infrastructure projects. For example,
structured participatory processes would have avoided the
confusion in 2015, in the massive Rio de Janeiro shantytown of
Rocinha, when the government announced it was going to install a
gondola to allow inhabitants to be transported up and down the
slum's hills. To the government's surprise and consternation,
residents organized and indicated that, if they had to choose, they
would choose improved sanitation services over transportation

is to give the public direct ownership of and responsibility for public spending.
See Avritzer 2013, supra note 150, at 157. Participatory budgeting is used widely
today across the world. See supra text accompanying note 150. Although slow to
come to the United States, it is beginning to be used here as well. See, e.g.,
MErRo COUNCEi DIsTRicr, Participatory Budgeting & District 8 Spending
Infonnation, https://louisvilleky.gov/government/metro-council-district-8/participatorybudgeting-district-8-spending-information (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (discussing
introduction in August 2018 to Louisville, Kentucky).
199 See PERLMAN, supra note 146; FERNANDES, supra note 181; Deboulet,
supra note 134, at 17; Janice Perlman, Rethinking PrecariousNeighborhoods:
Causes and Consequences of Marginality, in AGENCE FRANCAISE DE
DEVELOPPEMENT, RETHINKING PREcARIous NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 134, at

40.
200

See generally Santos, supra note 150.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

2018]

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

397

innovation. 201 This sort of participation would, furthermore,
constitute a form of access to justice, because it would mean that
people's own judgment about their needs was recognized, a
vindication of personal and concurrently, of a group right to a
salubrious environment.
Second, in cases of harm from water, air, or ground
contamination affecting human and plant health, for instance, a
participatory principle would provide that upon the occurrence of
an event, the public would have a right to express concerns and
participate in the collection of information about the harm. This,
too, would be a form of providing access to justice, because it
would recognize the value of popular concerns about events
directly affecting individuals and communities.
Third, such participation could help promote faster resolution
once harm has occurred. To again use a Brazilian
claims
of
example, consider how different the maddeningly elusive
settlement and remediation of the harms of the November 2015
Samarco mining disaster might have been had all stakeholders
been immediately given a means to share their experience, record
2 02
their harms, and receive speedy resolution of them.
Again, this participatory element of the access to justice
arguments offered here is not one that fits easily in the "lawfocused, top-down" access to justice model. In part, this is because
201 See Felipe Betim, A Rocinha Ndo Precisa de Teleftrico, Mas Sim de
Saneamento Bcisico ["Rocinha Does Not Need a Gondola but Basic Sanitation"],
EL PAS (Braz.) (Sept. 12, 2015), http://brasil.elpais.com/ brasil/2015/09/03/
politica/1441270863 849228.html (explaining that residents of the slum
characterized by steep hills preferred basic sanitation over a proposed gondola
system so as to reduce disease incidence).
202 On November 5, 2015, in the central Brazilian state of Minas Gerais (the
state name itself means General Mines), between 32 and 40 cubic tons of toxic
mud were released when a retention dam from a mining operation failed. The
ensuing flood of toxic mud and sludge killed 19 and inundated villagesincluding historic UNESCO sites. The flood destroyed thousands of hectares of
property and contaminated major water supplies for the region. The cleanup
continues, as do complaints from stakeholders like local residents and town
officials. See, e.g., Dom Phillips, Samarco Dam Collapse: One Year on from
Brazil's Worst Environmental Disaster, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2016),
2
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/ 016/oct/I 5/samarco-dam(last
collapse-brazil-worst-environmental-disaster-bhp-billiton-vale-mimng
visited Feb. 23, 2018). Moreover, nearly two years after the disaster, there was
no evident settlement in site. See, e.g., Daniel Camargos, Tentativa de Acordo
para Reparar Danos No Rio Doce Recebe Criticas [Attempted agreement to
repair harms from the Rio Doce receives critcisms], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO (Mar.
10, 2017).
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its definition of "justice" is much broader, understanding justice to
include the right of people to live in clean, safe, and healthy
environments. It is more closely compatible, however, with both
the "law-focused, bottom up" and legal empowerment views (the
latter being what I have called "integrated and requiring law"). In
the application of both frameworks, legal principles and guidelines
would be needed to determine the terms and conditions of
participation. Moreover, it is worth noting that both steps would
involve better-informed citizens if the educational measures
discussed above were implemented.
3.

Procedure

As noted above, restrictions on standing continue to impede
the successful assertion of collective and diffuse rights claims.2 03
Therefore, access to justice for cleaner, healthier, better ordered
urban and physical environments will require the articulation of
standing rules that do not insist, for example, on principles like
proof of individual harm. That is not the way most urban and
environmental harms are suffered. Just as the education and
participation elements are envisioned to allow for widespread
inclusion in acquiring information and making decisions as
elements of access to justice, so too the redress of grievances must
be understood to permit those with the time, resources, and energy
to step in and defend the collective and diffuse urban and
environmental interests at issue.
C.

Summary ofNormative Idealfor Justice Access Principle
Articulation in the Urban andEnvironmental Context

In sum, the argument advanced here suggests that access to
justice for speedier resolution of urban and environmental
concerns can be affected by a tripartite strategy which works to
educate, involve, and hasten access to justice for claim resolution
when needed. The normative value of such a strategy is both
simple and appealing: the first two steps (education and
participation) serve to reduce the need for redress, while the third
acknowledges that some conflict is inevitable and, by having a
more informed and involved citizenry, access to justice can be
widened. Moreover, the approach promotes greater transparency
because it recognizes that an aware and involved citizenry is more
203

See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
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likely to insist on securing its rights than in the current situation.
Currently, there is no lack of "good" urban and environmental
laws, but many of those laws create entitlements that are widely
unknown to those they are designed to protect, or are effectively
unavailable to them because of difficult standing requirements.
A central question, of course, as with any proposal to create a
new normative framework, is how best to pay for it. Any search
for such solutions should both be equitable and should focus on
serving the whole population-and thus on the collective and
diffuse interests that typically characterize urban and
environmental claims. I suggest that, in this context, the options
are neither terribly unusual nor difficult to implement. In
environmental matters, for example, the principle of "cradle to
grave" financial responsibility for the creation of substances
dangerous to the physical environment has long been successful in
the United States and elsewhere as a strategy to diminish
environmental harms. 20 A more widespread use of this principle,
together with now widely recognized principles like the
precautionary and polluter pays principles, 205 could result in an
effective system of financial responsibility to reduce and respond
to environmental harm.
With respect to financing claims for urban rights, an obvious
2 06
These
candidate would be to focus on value capture principles.
204 1 refer, for example, to the hazardous waste management and disposal rules
announced in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921 (a)(b) (on listing, identification and management of
hazardous wastes). On the financial mechanisms used to effect the goals of RCRA
and similar statutes, see, for example, U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, Waste,
Chemical and Clean-up Enfbrcement, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/waste-

chemical-and-cleanup-enforcement (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).
205 These principles have been internationally agreed to in documents like the
1972 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. See U.N. Conference
on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), P 15-16
(Aug. 12, 1992). On the increasing relevance of these principles in practice, see,
for example, Travis Miller, The Evolving Regulations and LiabilitiesEntwined in
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 46 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 219 n.47, 49 (2017).
206 This is not by any means a new idea. See, e.g., Nancy J. Hoffmeier
Zamora, New Financing Strategy for Rapid Transit: Model Legislation
Authorizing the Use of Benefit Assessments to Fund the Los Angeles Metro Rail,
35 UCLA L. REv. 519, 519-20 (1988) ("[T]he term 'value capture' has become a
common phrase among legislators and administrators responsible for funding major
capital improvements such as rapid transit projects."). Nor is it mere hyperbole:
"'About six months ago,' Judge [Ricard] Posner [the noted conservative jurist] said,
'I awoke from a slumber of 35 years.' He had suddenly realized, he said, that people
without lawyers are mistreated by the legal system, and he wanted to do something
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take different forms, such as tax increment financing and similar
techniques that seek to recoup the costs of development.2 07
Whatever the selected mechanism, the application of a value
capture principle could, like the environmental mechanisms
discussed above, implement a financing mechanism that is
equitable in its aim, redistributing the costs of environmental harm
and urban growth alike to those who would otherwise benefit from
reduced enforcement. For example, a tender for the expansion of a
metro system could require that the developers remit to the
relevant governmental unit a percentage of revenue reflecting the
benefit of the development to the entire area served by the metro
system, and not merely the places that benefit economically from
the location of stations.20 8 Where this is not required by law, the
recognition of this principle would permit more aware and
involved citizens to assert claims for value capture distribution. In
this way, the value capture principle-again like the environmental
financing principles suggested above-would also serve to
promote collective and diffuse interests.
CONCLUSION

Of course, while the enforcement mechanisms may be tried,
true, and effective, changing norms requires more than
enforcement. Normative shifts require a high degree of social
consensus on the need to make such a change. On the one hand,
that need may seem obvious enough: it is neither in the interest of
the broader society to tolerate the physical, environmental, and
emotional poverty of its population in the short- or the long-term.
about it." Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with RicardPosner, JudicialProvocateur,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/1 1/us/politics/judgerichard-posner-retirement.html.
207 See, e.g., John West and Michael Gruen, A Better Pathfor East Midtown,
23 CrrY L. 25 (2017) (arguing for tax increment financing instead of more
traditional zoning techniques to recover some financial benefits from
development in New York City).
208 This is notion is referred to as "value capture," whereby an entity retains
"some percentage of the value provided in every Transaction," making the offer
less attractive. Josh Kaufman, What is 'Value Capture'?, THE PERSONAL MBA,
https://personalmba.com/value-capture/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2018). Value
capture is especially contention in the transit arena, because developers and
speculators benefit from a system's expansion. For an example of how value
capture has gained currency in the public transportation arena, see PUB. TRANSP.
ADMIN., Value Capture, https://www.transit.dot.gov/valuecapture (last visited
Aug. 28, 2018).
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On the other hand, however, many societies continue to do so and
a global consensus to reduce poverty is not the rallying cry of our
time. Sadly, it may take a series of urban and environmental crises
triggered by widespread living conditions that are both unhealthy
and oppressive. In the meantime, however, focused efforts to take
measures like advocating loosened standing requirements and
augmenting urban and environmental education and participation
may go a long way to helping create more widespread access to
justice.
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